

CHAPTER TEN

AFTERMATH OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

(U) USAREUR Soviet Military Advisory Committee

(U) One of the primary lessons learned, first in the aftermath of the Nicholson incident and again during the USAREUR-GSFG negotiations, was that USAREUR headquarters did not have a suitable organization or committee to handle such matters -- or, as Colonel Parnell put it, "...the right people in the right piles at the right time."¹ As a consequence, an inactive former organization known as the Soviet Relations Advisory Committee (SRAC) was reestablished as the Soviet Military Advisory Committee (SMAC) in April 1986. A standing advisory committee, it was headed by ODCSOPS and consisted of various interested staff elements that could provide expertise or advice to the Command Group on routine and extraordinary matters pertaining to the Soviets.²

(S) Before discussing the establishment of SMAC and its initial activities in regard to the USAREUR-GSFG negotiations, it would be useful to outline the history of its predecessor committee. In 1952 -- as in 1985-86 -- there was a great deal of activity by the USAREUR staff that revolved around relations with the Soviets, particularly in the area of the military liaison missions. By September 1952 it had become evident that a more expeditious method of handling MLM staff actions was necessary. A USAREUR Intelligence Division study of the problem concluded that actions involving the Soviet and US MLMs should be processed by a committee composed of representatives from each of the interested staff divisions of USAREUR headquarters. The study was approved on 25 September, and the Soviet Relations Advisory Committee was formed on 7 October 1952 under the staff supervision and chairmanship of the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, with the Director of the Intelligence Division and the Chief of the Public Information Division being full-time permanent members. The Director of the Operations and Plans Division was also a permanent member, but was on call only for certain actions. The USAREUR Political Adviser served as an ex officio member of the committee. The heads of the staff divisions, with the exception of the Political Adviser, each designated one additional officer to sit as full-time members. They were allowed subsequently to appoint two additional members to sit on the committee. Normally, all actions of the committee were subject to the review of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

() The committee was called into session whenever any action involving one or both of the MLMs was needed. The committee prepared statements of policy with regard to both the Soviet and US missions, which clearly outlined the extent to which USAREUR could conduct offensive and retaliatory actions against SMLM. These statements also served as a guide for the overt activities of USMLM. After the proposed statement of policy was approved, the committee would prepare plans within the framework of that policy to counter the various Soviet options. The committee also prepared answers to Soviet protest letters, USAREUR protest letters, and appropriate news releases. Subsequently, the committee's responsibilities were broadened to include advising on all relations and actions with the Soviet Forces in East Germany.³

() The committee's membership remained unchanged during 1953-54, but its activities became more institutionalized. Its activities were slightly expanded to include any incidents that might occur due to actions by USAREUR military and civilian personnel, and its charter was refined to ensure it did not usurp other organizations' responsibilities. For instance, as a rule, incidents occurring in Berlin were considered within the competence of the US Commander in Berlin, and only such cases as he could not settle were turned over to the committee. In addition, the committee was not authorized to act on incidents that occurred along the Czechoslovak border, because USAREUR did not have direct liaison with Czechoslovak military authorities. Incidents in this area involving USAREUR personnel were handled through State Department channels. The primary activity of the committee, when it was not responding to real-world incidents, was to formulate a series of plans to counter potential Soviet actions.⁴

() The workload of the committee had decreased steadily by 1955. A significant improvement in US-Soviet relations was reflected in the decreasing number of GSFG protest letters received by the command: GSFG had submitted 275 protest letters in 1952, 140 in 1953, 40 in 1954, and only 6 in the early part of 1955. The Soviets were adhering closely to existing agreements, with USMLM members being permitted greater freedom of movement. After 1955 references to the Soviet Relations Advisory Committee cease in the USAREUR histories. It is assumed the committee met rarely during this period, since the staffing actions it had previously handled were still mentioned in the histories, but they were being taken care of by the overall staff elements.⁵

(U) Evidence that the committee was still operating, however, is contained in the documentation of several incidents subsequent to this period. The committee met on 12 March 1957 to determine what actions should be taken in response to a series of incidents in which Soviet soldiers had fired weapons at USMLM personnel detected on their installations. The committee was still chaired by the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, and included representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Information Division, and the Political Adviser.⁶

() The committee reemerges in the documentation after it held a meeting on 10 February 1961 to discuss overall relations with the Soviets. Minutes of the meeting indicate that the chairman was now the Chief of the Intelligence Division. The committee was composed of four other members from the Intelligence Division, one member from the Operations Division, one member from the Civil Affairs Division, the Political Adviser, and the Chief of USMLM.⁷

() The committee met again in 1962 in order to consider countermeasures against SMLM-F. At a meeting on 30 March 1962 it recommended against the countermeasures because they would put CINCUSAREUR in the position of violating agreements or of having permitted illegal acts against SMLM-F. At this particular meeting, the members were the chairman, who was the Chief of the Intelligence Division, plus three others from that division, the Political Adviser, and one representative each from the Provost Marshal Division and the Operations Division. After this meeting, documentation of the activities of the committee end, and it is assumed the committee was allowed to lapse at some future date.⁸

() In the latter part of January 1986, the USAREUR Military History Office furnished General Fiala with the above information in response to a tasker for all historical information on past dealings with GSFG by the USAREUR staff. After reading the furnished material, General Fiala decided to re-establish the Soviet Relations Advisory Committee: "[It] would have been helpful during Nicholson events and we functioned ad hoc with it anyway." ODCSOPS was told that it would chair the committee and that it should provide an organizational concept and recommended membership for the committee for General Fiala's approval. ODCSOPS was to include -- as a minimum -- representatives from the offices of Host Nation Affairs, the Political Adviser, DCSI, Public Affairs, the Staff Judge Advocate, and Military History.⁹

() General Fiala's decision to reestablish the SRAC as the Soviet Military Advisory Committee (SMAC) was not greeted with universal approval by the USAREUR staff. General Gordon and General Price thought that the emerging Crisis Action Team (CAT) concept could include any roles envisioned for the SMAC. The CAT would be functioning the next time a serious incident involving USMLM might arise, and it would be capable of staffing or tasking all necessary actions. Other staff members did not think there would be enough business to justify SMAC if it was kept narrowly focused on USMLM subjects. ODCSI and USMLM, in particular, were not in favor of organizing SMAC in that it would continue the process of broadening the staffing of USMLM actions, when both organizations preferred, for security purposes, that reviews and discussions of USMLM activities be kept in a narrower channel. A consensus emerged that SMAC might have a role as a subgroup of the CAT, but it would be important that its activities be confined to serious incidents and that it not be involved in routine USMLM actions.¹⁰

() Despite the reservations of some elements of the USAREUR staff, General Fiala decided to continue with his plan to establish SMAC:¹¹

I insisted it be formed since I had no intention of running all of the actions for such events as the Nicholson incident from the Keyes Building [Command Group]. We just don't have the manpower in SGS for that sort of thing. The only alternative would be to bring the Operations Center and these people into the Keyes Building, and that is not a viable option.

General Fiala envisioned SMAC having a broader charter than had been perceived originally by the staff: SMAC was to make recommendations to the Command Group on routine and extraordinary matters pertaining to the Soviets -- not just USMLM.¹²

(U) The first SMAC meeting was held on 3 April 1986 in the DCSOPS Operations Center. In addition to the Chief of the Operations Division, who chaired the meeting, ODCSOPS was represented by two permanent members from its Operations Division and one from its Plans Division. ODCSI had two permanent members and the following offices had one permanent member each: Public Affairs, Judge Advocate, Provost Marshal, Political Adviser, and Military History. Each organization

provided the name of one alternate. A by-name roster of primary and alternate members of the committee was to be maintained by ODCSOPS. It was anticipated that each organization's SMAC representatives would represent that organization on the CAT.* SMAC meetings would be called at the direction of the Command Group or DCSOPS. To ensure that sensitive information was protected, ODCSI was charged with preparing and staffing any correspondence pertaining to the committee's proceedings.¹³

(U) Still Another News Leak

() On 12 April SERB called USMLM to protest the latest news leak concerning the negotiations:

Despite the understandings achieved [at the staff negotiations], western news media are broadcasting distorted information on the results of our staff negotiations. Certain details [of the broadcasts] demonstrate that the leak is on the American side. In the opinion of Headquarters GSFG such speculation does not serve the interests of either side.

Actually, USMLM had learned of the news leak the previous day and had told SERB about it in an attempt to preempt Soviet charges that USMLM was trying to undermine the negotiations. The Soviets had said that they had already monitored early reports on various western radio broadcasts.¹⁴

(U) It was obvious from the news reports that the "leak" was from the US side, with the "Defense Department sources" seemingly under the impression they were releasing good news. "The Pentagon" said that Soviet sentries would be instructed they were not to use deadly force against properly-identified USMLM personnel, which would "significantly protect our members." All Soviet military personnel were to be instructed that, if they came in contact with MLM personnel, they were "to treat them in a manner so as to ensure their safety." Once again, the alleged intelligence-gathering activities of USMLM were placed squarely in the spotlight.¹⁵

* (U) The long-awaited Crisis Action Team would be established in August 1986. This CAT should not be confused with the ad hoc CAT that was prominent in earlier chapters. SOURCE: USAREUR Memo 525-5, 21 Aug 86, subj: Crisis Management and Contingency Operations. AEAGC-O-CO. UNCLAS.

() General Otis approved General Price's plan to tell the Soviets that the information appearing in the news media had not been released by USAREUR. On 17 April Colonel Lajoie read the following note verbale to Colonel Medved:

As MG Price stated on 10 April 1986, Headquarters USAREUR shares General-Major Bugrov's sentiments to avoid publicity of our joint discussions. Accordingly, USAREUR has not released such information to the news media. The western press, however, has amply demonstrated its ability to ferret out information using its own sources.

Headquarters USAREUR desires to promote good relations* with GSFG, not to exacerbate them.

() Colonel Medved expressed his thanks for the information, and promised he would convey it immediately to GSFG headquarters.

() Colonel Medved also passed on a thinly veiled warning that USMLM personnel should be extremely careful when touring East Germany due to the current unrest in the Middle East and the large number of Libyans operating in East Germany. Colonel Lajoie reported the warning to USAREUR headquarters, but he did not think the Libyans were a serious threat in that USMLM tours were very cautious during their touring activities and would be difficult targets for the Libyans to track.¹⁶

(U) Exchanging PRA Maps

() Allied discussions about the mechanism for exchanging new PRA maps with the Soviets had been ongoing since March. It had been decided at a 7 March tripartite meeting to present to the Soviets a note verbale proposing that the maps be exchanged on a specified date and that they be implemented at 2400 hours on the day of the exchange. (See Chapter 9's section on "Resolving Final Issues.")

* () The draft note verbale had said "the normalization of relations" rather than "good relations," but General Otis had changed it "because we can't 'normalize' so long as apology and compensation are still at issue." SOURCE: Note, w/incls, MG Price to CINC, 14 Apr 86, no subj. OADR.

() However, the Allies had to hold a chiefs-of-staff tripartite meeting on 3 April because the French had decided that there should be a 10-day delay between exchanging the maps and their implementation. General Fiala began the meeting by pointing out that the three CINCs had agreed previously that the maps would be implemented without a grace period. The French representatives said that their MLM had convinced their CINC that such a mechanism might surprise the Soviets and engender an attitude of stubborn opposition. US and British representatives were concerned that a grace period might lead the Soviets into thinking the maps were negotiable, which they were not. The French representatives agreed to ask their CINC to review his decision. The Allies did agree the note verbale would state that PRA maps would be exchanged 20 days after GSFG had agreed to the PRA map exchange proposal, regardless of which implementation date was eventually agreed upon.¹⁷

() The French agreed on 16 April that the maps would go into effect at 2400 hours on the same day as the exchange.¹⁸

() The new PRA maps were exchanged simultaneously by all four parties on 9 June 1986, with an effective time of 0001 on 10 June -- a one minute modification to the agreed-upon procedure. A preliminary assessment of the Soviet map confirmed that their PRAs covered approximately 25 percent of East Germany,* while Allied PRA coverage in their respective zones was as follows: US - 24.2 percent, British - 24.9 percent, and French - 27 percent. In addition to fulfilling their promise about percentage of PRA coverage, the Soviets also incorporated the agreements reached at the negotiations on border roads and Autobahn access.¹⁹

* () One interesting outgrowth of the reduced PRA coverage in East Germany was that, for the first time in 30 years, it would be possible to conduct extensive collection against naval targets along the East German coast. Previously, the majority of the coast had been in PRAs. As a consequence, the Navy's collection requirements for USMLM were expected to be increased. SOURCE: Msg, CTG One Six Eight PT Four to CTF One Six Eight, 281200 Jul 86, subj: USMLM Increased Collection Capability. OADR.

(U) Receipt of the Soviet Instruction Card

() Colonel William E. Halloran, who had assumed Colonel Lajoie's duties as Chief of USMLM in May 1986, presented his credentials to General Lushev on 9 July. General Lushev said that their joint work would consist of working for greater understanding and better relations between the two commands. General Lushev cited the recent PRA map exchange as an example of mutually advantageous work being accomplished by GSFG and USAREUR.

() Colonel Halloran pointed out that USAREUR had not yet received the long-promised MLM instruction card. He was assured that internal distribution of the card was nearly complete and that USAREUR would be provided a copy in the near future. Colonel Halloran tried to convey subtly that the course of future relations between the two commands was, in part, dependent upon receipt of the instruction card.²⁰

() The Soviets had asked on several occasions when their SMLMs would be allowed to resume interzonal travel and had been told informally that Allied policy was to lift the restriction after receipt of a copy of the Soviet MLM instruction card. To emphasize the point, on 15 August ACS officially notified SMLM-F that Allied restrictions on SMLM interzonal travel would be lifted upon receipt of the instruction card. All three Allies were prepared to suffer a reciprocal Soviet restriction on visitors to their MLMs in Potsdam, which would require all MLM visitors to enter and exit East Germany at Helmstedt.²¹

() On 22 August SERB presented Colonel Halloran with copies of the new Soviet MLM instruction card (see pages 355-356). ACS gave SMLM-F copies of the latest USAREUR MLM instruction card on the same day (see page 357). The language on the Soviet card closely adhered to that found in the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and the Agreed Summary. Unfortunately, the card also contained the last sentence of point 3, which said that the instructions on the card did not extend to the actions of a sentry on his post. Overall, the cards were viewed as a positive sign that the Soviets were attempting to comply with the Agreed Summary, and Colonel Halloran, as previously instructed, notified Colonel Pereverzev that the interzonal travel restriction had been lifted.²²

I. ПРАВОВОЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ВОЕННЫХ МИССИЙ СВЯЗИ ПРИ ГК ГСВГ

1. При Главнокомандующем Группой советских войск в Германии аккредитованы Американская, Британская и Французская военные миссии связи.

2. Членам иностранных военных миссий связи (ИВМС) разрешается свободное передвижение по всей территории ГДР за исключением постоянных и временных запретных районов, мест расположения воинских частей и военных объектов.

Членам ИВМС разрешается пользоваться автомобилями, проходящими через запретные районы, и дорогами, определяющими границы этих районов. Границы постоянных и временных запретных районов устанавливаются ГК ГСВГ.

3. Совершать поездки по территории ГДР членам миссий разрешается только в автомобилях своих миссий, имеющих на переднем и заднем бамперах специальные номерные знаки. При этом члены миссий должны иметь форму одежды своей армии со знаками различия присвоенного им воинского звания.

4. На всей территории ГДР члены ИВМС не имеют права заниматься наблюдением (с записками, зарисовками, составлением схем, с использованием биноклей и т.п.) за передвижением войск, за военными объектами и военной техникой, а также их фотографированием и киноъемкой.

II. ПОРЯДОК ДЕЙСТВИЯ ПРИ ОБНАРУЖЕНИИ АВТОМАШИН С ЧЛЕНАМИ ИВМС

1. Обнаружив автомашину ИВМС, каждый военнослужащий обязан лично или через своего командира (начальника) немедленно доложить об этом дежурному по части, а последний — в ближайшую к месту обнаружения автомашину ИВМС советскую военную комендатуру.

В докладе указывается:

— принадлежность и номер автомашины, время и место обнаружения (с привязкой на местность);

— численность и форма одежды экипажа;

— характер действий экипажа;

— направление движения автомашины.

III. ПОРЯДОК ДЕЙСТВИЯ ПРИ ЗАДЕРЖАНИИ АВТОМАШИН С ЧЛЕНАМИ ИВМС

1. Военнослужащие ГСВГ обязаны задерживать автомашины с членами ИВМС только в следующих случаях:

— на территории запретных районов, в местах расположения воинских частей и военных объектов независимо от характера деятельности экипажа автомашины ИВМС;

— на всей территории ГДР при ведении их в колонны боевой техники, организации наблюдения (с записками) за войсками и военными объектами, а также их фотографировании.

2. Задержание автомашин с членами ИВМС следует осуществлять в местах нарушения членами миссий установленных правил путем блокирования их автомашин таким образом, чтобы

не дать ему возможности покинуть место задержания до прибытия представителей советской военной комендатуры.

3. Задержав автомашину с членами ИВМС, военнослужащие обязаны доложить в ближайшую от места задержания советскую военную комендатуру следующие данные: номер автомашины ИВМС, состав экипажа; время, место и причину задержания.

Военнослужащим, задержавшим автомашину ИВМС, разрешается проверить документы у членов ее экипажа для установления их личности.

Производить разбор обстоятельств задержания имеют право только советские военные коменданты.

4. Против членов миссий категорически запрещается применять силу, оружие или совершать иные действия, которые могут угрожать их безопасности. Запрещается также обыскивать членов ИВМС и их автомашин, вступать в разговоры с членами миссий и объяснять им причину задержания.

Военнослужащие, осуществившие задержание автомашин с членами ИВМС, убывают с места задержания только с разрешения военного коменданта.

Примечание: Положения настоящей Памятки не распространяются на действия часового на посту, определенные УГАКС ВС СССР.

ЗНАЙ И СТРОГО ВЫПОЛНЯЙ!

Зав. 42-1

ВОИН ГСВГ. БУДЬ БДИТЕЛЕМ!

ПАМЯТКА

**по действиям при обнаружении
и задержании автомашин с членами
ИВМС**

Образцы номерных знаков автомашин ИВМС

Автомшины Британской военной миссии связи имеют номерные знаки с 1 по 15 включительно



Автомшины Американской военной миссии связи имеют номерные знаки с 20 по 29 включительно



Автомшины Французской военной миссии связи имеют номерные знаки с 30 по 38 включительно



SOVIET SIGHTING/DETENTION INSTRUCTION CARD
(Translation on next page)

TRANSLATION OF SOVIET DETENTION INSTRUCTION CARD

Translation of Soviet Sighting/Detention Instruction Card

I. The legal status of foreign military liaison missions attached to the CINC GSFG.

1. American, British and French Military Liaison missions are accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.
2. Members of the foreign military liaison missions (FVMS) are permitted free movement on the entire territory of the GDR with the exception of permanent and temporary restricted areas & areas of the disposition of military units and military objects.
3. Members of foreign military liaison missions are authorized to use automobiles which transit restricted areas, as well as roads which delineate the borders of these areas.
4. The boundaries of the permanent and temporary restricted zones are established by CINC, GSFG.
5. In order to accomplish their travel on the territory of the GDR, mission members are authorized to use only vehicles from their own missions, which have special license plates on the front and the bumper. During this (travel), mission members must wear the uniforms of their own Army with the symbols of the rank which has been awarded to them.
6. Throughout the territory of the GDR, members of foreign military liaison missions do not have the right to conduct observations (by means of notes, drawings, taking sketches, using binoculars, and similar actions) on the movement of troops, on military objects and military equipment, as well as photographing or making film recordings of them.

II. Procedures upon detection of vehicles with members of foreign military liaison missions.

1. Upon detection of a vehicle of a foreign military liaison mission, each servicemember is required to immediately report this personally or through his Commander (Chief).
 - To the unit duty officer and then to the military Komandatura closest to the area where the foreign military liaison mission vehicle was detected.
- The report should include:
 - The nationality and number of the vehicle, time and location of detection (with a grid)
 - Number and type of uniforms of the crew
 - The actions of the crew
 - Direction of movement of the vehicle.

III. Procedures for detaining vehicles with members of foreign military liaison missions.

1. Service members of GSFG are required to detain vehicles with members of foreign military liaison missions only under the following circumstances:
 - On the territory of restricted areas, (and) in areas of the disposition of military units and military objects, regardless of the actions of the crew of the foreign military liaison mission vehicles.
 - Throughout the territory of the GDR when they have weapons (themselves) into a column of military vehicles, conducted observations (with making notes) of troops and military objects, as well as photographing them.
2. The detention of vehicles with members of foreign military liaison missions is to be accomplished at location in which mission members have violated prescribed regulations by blocking their vehicles in such a way so as

to not give them an opportunity to leave the place of detention until the arrival of representatives of the Soviet military Komandatura.

3. Having detained a vehicle with members of a foreign military liaison mission, servicemembers are required to report to the Soviet military Komandatura closest to the place of detention the following data: The number of the foreign military liaison mission vehicle-the number of crew-and the time, place and reasons for detention.
4. Servicemembers who have detained a foreign military liaison mission vehicle are authorized to examine the documents of the members of the crew in order to establish their identities.
5. Only Soviet military Komandaturas have the right to conduct an investigation into the circumstances of the detention.
6. It is categorically prohibited to use force or weapons against missions members to commit other acts which could threaten their safety. It is likewise forbidden to search members of foreign military liaison missions and their vehicles to enter into conversation with mission members or to explain to them why they were detained.
7. Servicemembers who accomplish a detention of a vehicle with members of foreign military liaison missions will leave the place of detention only upon permission of the military Komandant.

NOTE: The provisions of this card do not extend to the actions of a sentry on his post, as defined by the garrison and guard service regulations of the armed forces of the USSR (GDI KS VS SSR).

Know and strictly implement

Soldier of GSFG, be vigilant!
Instruction card

of actions upon detection and detention of vehicles
with personnel of foreign military liaison missions

examples of license plates of vehicles of foreign military liaison missions
Vehicles of British Military Liaison Mission have license plates from 1 to 15 inclusive.

Vehicles of the American Military Liaison Mission have license plates from 20 to 29 inclusive.

Vehicles of the French Military Liaison Mission have license plates from 30 to 38 inclusive.

THIS is what your sighting report should contain:

1. LICENSE NUMBER of SMLM vehicle
2. COLOR and MAKE of SMLM vehicle
3. TIME and DATE of sighting
4. LOCATION where SMLM vehicle was seen (give details like name of town, number of highway or autobahn, kilometer-stone marker or coordinates if possible, between which towns, on autobahn between which exits, etc)
5. DIRECTION of TRAVEL of SMLM vehicle and if it was parked or moving
6. OCCUPANTS: Number, sex, type of clothing worn
- SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS: Were occupants out of vehicle, using cameras, binoculars, maps, note books, etc? Was vehicle involved in running convoys, near military units or installations, near maneuver areas, etc?

AE Form 3231, Jul 38
PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.

SMLM SIGHTING/DETENTION INSTRUCTIONS

(USAREUR Reg 330-43)

This is what a license plate of a
SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
(SMLM)
vehicle looks like
(The number being different in each case)

3



SOVIET MILITARY MISSION USAREUR

If you see a SMLM vehicle, notify
IMMEDIATELY

- TELEPHONE Mil 2311-6066 or
AUTOVON/ETS 320-6066 or
- TELEPHONE Mil 98 or ETS-114
- TELEPHONE Civ 069-131-6066

ACT QUICKLY! BE ACCURATE!

LATE SIGHTINGS ARE ALSO IMPORTANT

DETENTIONS

1. IN THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES SMLM SHOULD BE DETAINED:

1. if in a Permanent Restricted Area (PRA) or Temporary Restricted Area (TRA), SMLM has unrestricted access to autobahns for transit through PRA and TRA.
2. if SMLM personnel are observed photographing, sketching or observing (undue interest) U.S. troop installations or activities in non-restricted areas, SMLM should be detained, provided the detention can be effected within the immediate vicinity of the installation or activity. SMLM may be detained for undue interest on or along autobahns.
3. A DETENTION MAY BE EFFECTED BY ANY MEMBER OF THE US FORCES.

When making detention, no force should be used or lives endangered. If possible, SMLM vehicle should be boxed in by US vehicles to keep from leaving the scene. Once detention is effected, you:

1. DO:

1. Show military courtesy and ask the occupants for identification.
2. Make sure SMLM vehicle has no way to get away.
3. Secure the scene and direct traffic on highway to keep obstruction to a minimum. Make absolutely sure that MPs are coming to take over.
4. Offer assistance in case of accident or injury.

4. DO NOT:

1. Release the SMLM vehicle unless instructed by HQ USAREUR.
2. Interrogate or question SMLM personnel.
3. Open doors of, or search, SMLM vehicle.
4. Tell the SMLM members why they are detained.
5. Enter into arguments or allow SMLM members to intimidate you with threats.

KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING - KNOW THE PRA/TRA's NEAR YOUR BASE, HOME, AND TRAINING AREA OR EXERCISE AREA.

(U) Lifting the Sanctions Against SMLM

(.) The Allies had agreed at a 26 March 1985 tripartite meeting in Heidelberg that six sanctions would be imposed on the SMLMs in West Germany in response to the Nicholson shooting. (See Chapter 3's section on "Initial Sanctions Against the Soviets.") SMLM personnel had been confined to their facilities only for a designated period of time that had coincided with the funeral ceremonies for Major Nicholson, overt surveillance of SMLM tour vehicles had been cancelled in July 1985, and SMLM access to post exchange facilities had gradually been reinstated by all three Allies.²³ The restriction on inter-zonal travel by SMLM personnel had just been lifted on 22 August 1986 (see above). The only sanctions still in effect at this point were the limitations on SMLM support and official or social contacts with the Soviets. Official contacts had been severely reduced and social contacts had been completely eliminated.

(.) By early 1987 ACS would again be providing a high level of support for the SMLM facility in Frankfurt based upon reciprocal support that was being provided for USMLM in Potsdam. In addition, ACS personnel had resumed visits and local activities with SMLM personnel in accordance with instructions from Washington.²⁴

(.) The USAREUR-GSFG negotiations and extensive meetings between USMLM and SERB had made the issue of official contacts between the commands a moot point, but the issue of resuming social contacts remained unresolved as this study was closed in November 1987. Numerous attempts by USMLM and USAREUR to convince higher echelons that it was counterproductive to continue the sanctions in view of the successful conclusion of the negotiations had been unsuccessful. Secretary Weinberger was adamant throughout this period that social contacts would not be resumed until the apology and compensation issue was resolved.²⁵ Eventually, the bar on social contacts with the Soviets transcended the Nicholson shooting and became an extension of the US protest of Soviet actions in Afghanistan.²⁶

(U) Assessment of Soviet Compliance With the Agreed Summary

(.) The 1 April 1986 JCS message that granted USAREUR permission to sign the Agreed Summary also required that an assessment of Soviet compliance with the Agreed Summary be submitted by 1 October. (See Chapter 9's section on "Resolving Final Issues.") USAREUR forwarded the required assessment on 11 September:²⁷

In East Germany (GDR), Soviets are in compliance with agreement, and HQ GSFG continues to send strong signals that it desires improved relations with HQ USAREUR. Procedures agreed to during negotiations are working and have both enhanced physical safety of Allied MLM tour personnel and resulted in improved intelligence collection environment because of significant reduction in permanent restricted area (PRA). In spite of this, however, possibility that serious incident might occur in future cannot be ruled out. Even though there may be an increased awareness among Soviet soldiers about their responsibilities toward MLM personnel, fact remains that Allied MLM operate in an area which contains over one-half million Soviet and East German servicemen. [It is] simply impossible for either side to guarantee absolutely that no use of force (especially if unintentional, or result of miscalculation or misjudgement) will ever be used. On balance, however, situation that exists today in GDR is improvement over environment that existed when Major Nicholson was killed.

() USAREUR went on to state that, even though the Soviets had been slow to produce the instruction cards, there had been fewer incidents and detentions involving Allied MLM personnel since concluding the Agreed Summary than was the case during a comparable period prior to its signing.

() Of particular note was a 9 July 1986 incident in which an East German military vehicle had collided with a USMLM tour vehicle. In responding to the US protest note, Colonel Pereverzev had stated that "measures have been taken to prevent such a recurrence." The East German military personnel had been located, and USMLM was assured that the collision had been unintentional. Unintentional or not, the significance of this incident was that, for the first time, the Soviets had acknowledged responsibility for ensuring that East German military personnel would comply with the Agreed Summary's basic guarantee of safety for USMLM personnel.

() In related areas, SERB had been more responsive in supporting USMLM as well as in assisting during detentions and incidents, and the SMLMs in West Germany were rated as complying reasonably well with provisions of the Agreed Summary.

() The wild card remained the potential for miscalculation or over-vigilance on the part of Soviet and East German military personnel. USMLM personnel were aware that special care must be exercised whenever they sighted armed military personnel.²⁸

CHAPTER TEN FOOTNOTES

1. COL Parnell Intvw. (info used UNCLAS).
2. Memo, MG Price to CofS, 10 Apr 86, subj: USAREUR Soviet Military Advisory Committee. AEAGC. UNCLAS.
3. EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 417-18.
4. USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, Jan 53 - Jun 54, pp. 470-72.
5. USAREUR Anl Hist Rept, Jul 54 - Jun 55, pp. 334-35.
6. DF, CAD to CofS, 14 Mar 57, subj: Soviet Relations Advisory Committee Meeting, 12 Mar 57. AEACA. UNCLAS.
7. MFR, Mr. W.J. McTigue, Sec SRAC, 10 Feb 61, subj: Soviet Relations Advisory Committee Meeting. AEAGB.
8. MFR, LTC F.C. Hopper, Jr., C/Sec Br, Intel Div, 30 Mar 62, subj: Classified title (short title: SMLM). AEAGB-S(DS).
9. Memo, w/notes, LTC B.A. Malogrides, Asst SGS, to DCSOPS, 30 Jan 86, subj: USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee. AEAGS. UNCLAS.
10. (1) MG Fiala Intvw. (2) MG Gordon Intvw. (3) LTC Elliott Intvw. (4) Mr. Gambolati Intvw (all cited above). (5) Intvw, CPT J.D. Ploen, ODCSI/COL DIV/MIL AFF, 24 Jun 86. (1) - (5) OADR. (6) Fact Sheet, Mr. Gambolati, 31 Mar 86, subj: Standing Advisory Committee. AEAGB. UNCLAS.
11. MG Fiala Intvw. OADR.
12. DF, ODCSOPS to ODCSI, et al., 9 Apr 86, subj: USAREUR Soviet Military Advisory Committee (SMAC). AEAGC-O. UNCLAS.
13. (1) 9 Apr 86 DCSOPS DF, w/incl. (2) Memo, w/note, MG Price to CofS, 10 Apr 86, subj: USAREUR Soviet Military Advisory Committee. AEAGC. Both UNCLAS.
14. OF 41, w/incls, CPT Ploen to MG Price, 14 Apr 86, subj: Media Coverage of Agreed Summary. AEAGB-C(HO). OADR.
15. The Stars & Stripes (Eur ed), 13 Apr 86, pp. 1 & 28. UNCLAS.

16. (1) Note, w/incls, MG Price to CINC, 14 Apr 86, no subj.
(2) Msg, CINCUSAREUR (AEAGB-C[HO]) to CUSMLM, 170655 Apr 86,
subj: Note Verbale. (3) Msg, CUSMLM (AEUS) to HQ USAREUR
(AEAGB-C[HO]), 180900 Apr 86, subj: Meeting With SERB, 17 Apr
86. All & OADR.
17. "Minutes of Tripartite Meeting, Thurs, 3 Apr 1986," pre-
pared by Mr. Gambolati, 17 Apr 86. OADR.
18. Memo, MG Gordon to CofS, 26 Apr 86, subj: PRA Maps.
AEAGB. OADR.
19. (1) Ltr, MG Fiala to MG Shevtsov, 9 Jun 86, no subj. No
file. UNCLAS. (2) Memo, COL Gillespie to CofS, 10 Jun 86,
subj: GSFG Announcement of New Permanent Restricted Areas
(PRA). AEAGB. OADR. (3) Memo, MG Price to CofS,
28 Apr 86, subj: Additional Soviet Issues. AEAGC.
OADR. (4) News Bulletin for Information and Personnel
Security, No. 8-86, Aug 86, subj: New PRA Map. AEAGB-CI(S)
UNCLAS.
20. Msg, CINCUSAREUR (AEAGX) to USCINCEUR (ECCS), 150935 Jul
86, subj: CUSMLM Meeting With CINCGSFG. OADR.
21. Memo, w/note, COL Greife to CofS, 15 Aug 86, subj: SMLM
Interzonal Travel. AEAGB. OADR.
22. Memo, MG C.B. Eichelberger, USAREUR DCSI, to CofS, 25 Aug
86, subj: Receipt of Soviet Instruction Cards. AEAGB.
OADR.
23. Chart prepared by Mr. Gambolati, 12 May 86, subj:
Nicholson Sanctions Against SMLM. AEAGB-CI. OADR.
24. Memo, w/incl, MG Eichelberger to CINC, 15 Apr 87, subj:
CINC Visit to SMLM-F, 22 April 1987. AEAGB. OADR.
25. The files for this study contain numerous messages and
memorandums that reflect the efforts of USMLM and USAREUR to
secure permission to attend Soviet social functions and
ceremonies. All were denied by higher headquarters.
26. Msg, HQ DA (DAMI-FL) to ARSTAF, et al., 291530 Apr 87,
subj: Attendance at Soviet Receptions. OADR.
27. Msg, CINCUSAREUR (AEACC) to USCINCEUR (ECDC), 111111 Sep
86, subj: Assessment of Soviet Compliance With 10 Apr 86
USAREUR-GSFG Agreements. OADR.
28. Ibid. OADR.

(U) Several events occurred in 1987 that caused USAREUR to revise its cautious, wait-and-see assessment of Soviet compliance with the Agreed Summary to one of serious reservations about whether the Soviet military leadership really had its soldiers under control.

(U) The first indication that Soviet soldiers still might have a "shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later" attitude appeared in the West German news media. It was reported on 11 June 1987 that two East German teenagers had been shot to death by a Soviet guard as they attempted to climb a wall that enclosed a Soviet Army barracks. Obviously, it was still extremely dangerous to be an unidentified intruder on a Soviet military facility.¹

(U) Of more concern to USAREUR, however, was a serious shooting incident that occurred on 17 September 1987. Soviet personnel dressed in black, civilian-style clothing attempted to detain a USMLM tour composed of Captain Bennett McCutcheon and Master Sergeant Charles Barry, both members of the Air Force team at USMLM. As they attempted to depart the area, one of the Soviets fired at the vehicle and superficially wounded Sergeant Barry in his upper arm. It should be noted that this area is not very far from several vital organs.²

(U) As with the Nicholson shooting, the timing of the Barry shooting could not have been worse. In this instance, the United States and the Soviet Union were jointly announcing that they had agreed in principle on a treaty limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The most dramatic difference in the way the Soviets handled the Barry incident in contrast to the Nicholson incident was Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's immediate apology for the shooting. It was highly unusual for any member of the Soviet Government to apologize for such an incident -- and it was almost unheard of for a member of the Politburo to do the apologizing! Unfortunately, both Shevardnadze's apology and the follow-on apology by the GSFG commander, General V. Belikov, were watered down by accusations that the USMLM crew had been engaging in intelligence collection activities.³

() The incident occurred in an unrestricted area and there were no indications the Soviet personnel were sentries.⁴

() Despite the apologies, and indications that the GSFG chain of command was indeed disturbed by the incident and taking serious measures to insure the safety of the Allied Military Liaison Missions, it appeared that USMLM personnel touring in East Germany were still exposed to considerable hazard.

FOOTNOTES FOR EPILOGUE

1. The Stars & Stripes (Eur ed), 13 Jul 87, p. 8. UNCLAS.
2. (1) Msg, CUSMLM (AEUS) to CINCUSAREUR (AEAGB-C, AEACC, AEAGX), 171840 Sep 87, subj: Initial Report of USMLM Incident. (2) Msg, same to same, 172300 Sep 87, subj: Follow-up Report of USMLM Incident 87-2. Both & OADR.
3. (1) The Stars & Stripes (Eur ed), 19 Sep 87, pp. 1 & 28. (2) Ltr, GEN V. Belikov, CINCGSFG, to GEN Otis, 20 Sep 87, no subj. Both UNCLAS.
4. 172300 Sep 87 CUSMLM Msg. OADR.

GLOSSARY

ACS	Allied Contact Section
AKT	Russian for an act, legal document, or indictment
BDU	battle dress uniform
BG	Brigadier General
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CI	counterintelligence
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCBAOR	Commander in Chief, British Army of the Rhine
CINCGSFG	Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe
Cofs	Chief of Staff
DCSHNA	Deputy Chief of Staff, Host Nation Activities
DCSI	Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
DCSRM	Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management
DoD	Department of Defense
EUCOM	European Command
FFA	Forces Francaises en Allemagne (French Forces in Germany)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces Germany
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I&W	Indications and Warnings
JA	Judge Advocate
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEDDAC	Medical and Dental Activity
MG	Major General
MLM	military liaison mission
MRS	mission restriction signs

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVREP	naval representative
NCO	noncommissioned officer
OCPA	Office of the Chief of Public Affairs
ODCSI	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
OJA	Office of the Judge Advocate
OJCS	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PNG	persona non grata
POLAD	Political Adviser
PRA	permanently restricted area
RECON BRIEF	reconnaissance briefing
SERB	Soviet External Relations Branch
SGS	Secretary of the General Staff
SMAC	Soviet Military Advisory Committee
SMLM-F	Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt
SNF	SECRET/NOFORN
SRAC	Soviet Relations Advisory Committee
TRA	temporarily restricted area
USAREUR	US Army, Europe
USCINCEUR	US Commander in Chief, Europe
USEUCOM	US European Command
USMLM	US Military Liaison Mission
V-E	Victory in Europe

APPENDIX A
OFFICIAL PROTEST LETTER



UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, AND SEVENTH ARMY
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
APO 00403

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

March 26, 1985

General Mikhail M. Zaytsev
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

General Zaytsev:


With this letter, I am lodging an official protest of the gravest nature.

At approximately 1545 hours, 24 March 1985, one of your soldiers deliberately shot and murdered an unarmed member of my military liaison mission, Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., in the vicinity of Ludwigslust, East Germany. Following the shooting, your Soviet soldier also prohibited the administering of emergency lifesaving measures by Major Nicholson's driver, Sergeant Jessie G. Schatz. This wanton act of violence is the most serious in the 38 year history of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement

You are aware that the Huebner-Malinin Agreement provides that the members of our liaison missions are to be permitted complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever desired over the territory and roads in both zones. The only exceptions to this free travel guarantee have been the permanent and temporary restricted areas periodically established by our sides. Major Nicholson was not within one of your restricted areas; he was exercising his legitimate right of free travel. The fact that the sentry clearly recognized the mission vehicle and mission personnel and still opened fire indicates that this action had the tacit approval of Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG). It is also unconscionable that your soldier and his superiors did not allow Sergeant Schatz to administer first aid to Major Nicholson.

On 19 March 1985, personnel from your Soviet Military Liaison Mission-Frankfurt, were detected violating a permanent restricted area in the U.S Army, Europe zone near Hof. When they were detained by our forces on 20 March for that violation, they were treated, as always, in a civil, safe, and professional manner. No one was harmed. Conversely, the actions by your soldier in this latest incident were completely uncalled for and show a total disregard for human life.

I strongly protest this violent action by your soldier which has resulted in the needless and unjustified death of one of my officers, who, like your liaison officers, was unarmed. I demand a full investigation and explanation of this incident, that measures be taken to insure that the personnel responsible are punished, and that measures be implemented to insure that an incident such as this will not recur.



Glenn K. Otis
General, U.S. Army
Commander in Chief

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS BLANK

Un-numbered

APPENDIX B
U.S. - SOVIET EXCHANGES

UNCLASSIFIED

Commander in Chief

Group of Soviet Forces, Germany

9 April 1985

No. 157

General:

As the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany I note with regret that in your letter ~~me~~ concerning the incident involving the American Military Liaison Mission on 24 March 1985 there is no acceptance of responsibility for the incident from the American side.

A thorough and complete examination irrefutably attests that the incident occurred because of a flagrant violation on the side of the representative of USMLM of paragraph 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of 3 April 1947 where it states: "Each member of the missions will be given identical opportunity for movement, to include identical permanent passes in Russian and English languages, allowing complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision."

On Sunday, 24 March 1985, violators in camouflage uniforms in an automobile with license plates smeared with dirt penetrated onto the territory of a closed military installation, onto a guard post for military equipment. One of them broke a metal shutter of a window and entered into the storage shed. In this situation the guard did not have the opportunity to identify the vehicle and assumed the ill intentions on the part of the violators. Acting in strict accordance with military regulations (they are approximately the same in all armies), he demanded in Russian and in German that the violators stop, then fired a warning shot upwards. If Major Nicholson had fulfilled the legal demands of the guard, then his life would not have been endangered; but Major Nicholson did not heed the demands of the guard, on the contrary he attempted at any costs to escape to his vehicle to hide with his acquired intelligence and thereby forced the guard to use his weapon.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

I want to call your attention to the fact that having heeded the demands of the guard SSG Schatz was not subjected to any kind of forceful actions. Also there is no basis for any accusations against the Soviet side that SSG Schatz was supposedly prohibited from aiding Major Nicholson. SSG Schatz not only did not try to do this but categorically refused to leave his vehicle abiding by his orders not to abandon his vehicle.

By the initiative of the Soviet soldiers a doctor was immediately summoned and who stated that, for all practical purposes, Major Nicholson's death was instantaneous.

On the whole the actions of the members of the USMLM had a clear intelligence gathering nature which is confirmed by the developed film from the camera. The violation into the territory of the military equipment guard post guarded by a sentry was an especially dangerous act.

And now on to another question -- the eviction of military liaison mission members from restricted areas. The military members of GSFG when convinced that the violators are members of USMLM have not, do not, and in the future have no intention of using weapons to detain or evict violators from restricted areas.

So it was in another critical situation when the members of the USMLM having been detained for conducting intelligence collection in a restricted zone in the area of Rarbek the district of Potsdam intentionally ran over a Soviet officer inflicting upon him severe bodily injury.

In the incident of 24 March, the Soviet side showed loyalty and restraint, having invited to the location of the incident the Chief, USMLM, Colonel Lajoie, who on that spot with the Chief of Staff, GSFG, had the opportunity to become familiar with the circumstances of the incident and to report to his headquarters what had occurred with Major Nicholson and who was at fault in this. We are now convinced that Colonel Lajoie did not present an objective

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

report of what happened. In light of this (COL Lajoie's report) currently an attempt (by the US) is being made to substitute the actions of the sentry in performance of his duties with a totally different question - the eviction of violators from restricted areas.

I, as the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, express regrets for the tragic result of what occurred on 24 March 1985; however, all responsibility for this lies completely on the American side. In this connection, I reject your protest and all accusations that are directed against the staff of GSFG and the Soviet sentry and ask you to take active measures for the strict compliance by the American side with the 1947 agreement.

General, in accordance with the agreement reached between the Soviet and American sides, I agree to a personal meeting with you in order to conclude the investigation of this incident.

I propose the meeting, with your approval, to take place in Wuensdorf or Potsdam (Officers' Club).

With the aim of its preparation, I propose to expeditiously assign a Deputy Chief of Staff of GSFG, and Chief, USMLM to meet in Potsdam for a precise determination of questions subject to discussion and examination of possible measures for the preventing of similar incidents involving members of military missions in the future.

M. ZAYTSEV
General of the Army

To General Glenn K. Otis
Commander in Chief
US Army, Europe

UNCLASSIFIED

128183A.10M



UNCLASSIFIED

Главкомандующий Группой советских войск в Германии

9 апреля 1985 г.

№ 157

Господин Генерал,

Как Главкомандующий Группой советских войск в Германии с сожалением отмечаю, что в Вашем письме по поводу инцидента с военнослужащими Американской военной миссии связи 24 марта 1985 года нет признания ответственности американской стороны за инцидент.

Тщательное и полное расследование неопровержимо свидетельствует о том, что инцидент произошел в результате грубого нарушения со стороны представителей АВМС ст.10 Соглашения "КЮБНЕР-МАЛИНИН" от 3 апреля 1947 года, где сказано: "Каждому члену миссий будут предоставлены одинаковые возможности передвижения, включая идентичные постоянные пропуска на русском и английском языках, разрешающие полную свободу передвижения, когда и где будет желательно, по территории и дорогам обеих зон, кроме мест расположения войсковых частей, без сопровождения и надзора".

В воскресенье, 24 марта, нарушители в маскировочных костюмах на автомашине с замазанными грязью опознавательными знаками проникли на территорию закрытого военного городка, прорвались на пост по охране боевой техники. Один из них взломал металлический ставень окна и проник внутрь хранилища.

Часовой в такой ситуации не имел возможности опознать машину и предположил диверсионные намерения нарушителей. Действуя в строгом соответствии с воинским уставом (а они примерно одинаковы во всех армиях), он потребовал на русском и немецком языках, чтобы нарушитель остановился, затем сделал предупредительный выстрел вверх. Если бы майор НИКОЛСОН выполнил законные требования часового, то его жизнь не была бы подвергнута опасности. Но майор НИКОЛСОН не подчинился требованиям часового, напротив, он стремился любой ценой прорваться к машине, скрыться с добытыми разведданными и вынудил часового применить оружие.

Хочу обратить Ваше внимание на то, что к выполнившему требования часового штаб-сержанту ШАТЦУ не было применено никаких насильственных действий.

Нет никаких оснований и для обвинения советской стороны в том, что штаб-сержанту ШАТЦУ, якобы, было запрещено оказать помощь майору НИКОЛСОНУ. Штаб-сержант

UNCLASSIFIED

ШАТЦ не только не пытался сделать это, но и категорически отказался выйти из машины, сославшись на приказ не покидать машину.

Именно по инициативе советских военнослужащих сразу же был вызван врач, который констатировал практически мгновенную смерть НИКОЛСОНА.

В целом, действия военнослужащих Американской военной миссии связи носили явно разведывательный характер, что подтверждает проявленная пленка из фотоаппарата, а прорыв на территорию поста с боевой техникой, охраняемого часовым, явился особо опасным действием.

И совершенно другой вопрос - выдворение военнослужащих миссии связи из запретных районов. Военнослужащие ГСВГ, будучи уверенными в том, что нарушителями являются члены АВМС, при задержании и выдворении из запретных районов не применяли, не применяют и в будущем не имеют намерений применять оружие.

Так было даже в такой критической ситуации, когда члены АВМС при задержании за ведение разведки в запретной зоне в районе н.п.Рарбек, округ Потсдам, совершили умышленный наезд на советского офицера, причинив ему тяжкие телесные повреждения.

И в инциденте 24 марта советская сторона проявила лояльность и выдержку, пригласив на место происшествия начальника АВМС полковника ЛАДЖОЯ, который, находясь там вместе с начальником штаба ГСВГ, имел возможность ознакомиться с обстоятельствами инцидента и доложить своему командованию, что же произошло с майором НИКОЛСОНОМ и кто в этом виновен. Сейчас же у нас сложилось убеждение, что полковник ЛАДЖОЯ не представил объективного доклада о случившемся. Ввиду этого в настоящее время предпринимается попытка подменить действия часового по охране и обороне поста с боевой техникой совершенно другим вопросом - выдворением нарушителей из запретных районов.

У меня, как у Главнокомандующего Группой советских войск в Германии, вызывает сожаление трагический исход происшедшего 24 марта 1985 года, однако вся ответственность за это полностью лежит на американской стороне.

В этой связи я отклоняю Ваш протест и все обвинения в адрес штаба ГСВГ и советского часового и прошу Вас принять действенные меры по строгому выполнению Соглашения 1947 года американской стороной.


Господин Генерал, в соответствии с достигнутой между советской и американской сторонами договоренностью я согласен на личную встречу с Вами с тем, чтобы завершить рассмотрение вопроса с этим инцидентом.

Встречу предлагаю при Вашем согласии провести в Вюнсдорфе или в г.Потсдаме (Дом офицеров).

UNCLASSIFIED

3.

С целью ее подготовки полагаю целесообразным поручить заместителю начальника штаба ГСВГ и начальнику АВМС при Главнокомандующем ГСВГ встретиться в г.Потсдаме для уточнения подлежащих обсуждению вопросов и рассмотрения возможных мер по предотвращению подобных инцидентов с членами военных миссий в будущем.



М.ЗАЙЦЕВ

Генерал армии

Генералу Гленну К.ОТИСУ
Главнокомандующему Сухопутными
войсками США в Европе

UNCLASSIFIED



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, and SEVENTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
APO 09403

UNCLASSIFIED

April 10, 1985

General Mikhail M. Zaytsev
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

General Zaytsev:

I will convey the full contents of your letter to General Otis upon his return from the United States later today. However, he has directed that I provide you the following.

General Otis desires an immediate meeting with you to discuss the issues surrounding the recent murder of Major Nicholson. The meeting should take place anytime after noon tomorrow, April 11, 1985. CINCUSAREUR proposes that the meeting be held in either Frankfurt, Hof, Helmstedt or Bad Hersfeld, Federal Republic of Germany. No preliminary meetings between our staffs are necessary. Your reply may be transmitted through your liaison mission chief or through mine.

It is essential that CINCUSAREUR receive a timely response in order that final details of the meeting can be coordinated.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. J. Fiala
Major General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE CHIEF OF STAFF
of the
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

11 April 1985

No. 164

Major General,

Proceeding from the understanding reached between the Soviet and American sides, we believe that a preliminary meeting of our representatives is both essential and advisable so as to determine the range of issues subject to discussion, and the times and place for conducting the [CINC-to-CINC] meeting.

The Commander-in-Chief of GSFG expects a response from General Otis personally to the proposals made earlier by the Soviet side.

/ s /

G. KRIVOSHEYEV
General-Colonel

TO Major General C.J. Fiala
Chief of Staff
US Army - Europe

UNCLASSIFIED

Нагальникштаба UNCLASSIFIED
Группы советских войск в Германии

11 " *апреля* *1985* .

№ *164*

Господин генерал-майор,

Исходя из достигнутой договоренности между советской и американской сторонами, мы считаем предварительную встречу представителей для определения круга подлежащих обсуждению вопросов, сроков и места проведения встречи необходимой и целесообразной.

Главкомандующий ГСВГ ожидает лично от генерала ОТИСА ответа на ранее внесенные советской стороной предложения.



Г. КРИВОШЕЕВ
Генерал-полковник

Генерал-майору Ч. Дж. ФИАЛА
Начальнику штаба Сухопутных
войск США в Европе



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, and SEVENTH ARMY
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
APO 09403

UNCLASSIFIED

11 April 1985

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF: P


General Mikhail M. Zaytsev
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

General Zaytsev:

In your letter of 9 April you agreed to a personal meeting with me in order to conclude the investigation of the incidents surrounding the murder of Major Nicholson. I accept your offer.

Due to the nature of this serious situation I propose that we meet immediately without preliminary staff meetings. In this regard, the meeting can take place today or at the latest on 12 April 1985.

I propose that this urgent meeting take place in Frankfurt, Federal Republic of Germany, at the Headquarters of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission. As an alternative, I would accept a meeting in Potsdam, German Democratic Republic, at the Potsdam Headquarters of the US Military Liaison Mission to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.


Glenn K. Otis
General, U. S. Army
Commander in Chief

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, and SEVENTH ARMY
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
APO 09403

UNCLASSIFIED

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF: ,

May 1, 1985

General Mikhail M. Zaytsev
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

General Zaytsev:

During our April 12th, 1985 meeting, we agreed that both sides would take following measures:

First, we agreed to conduct our liaison missions in strict compliance with the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

Second, we agreed that our military liaison mission teams would not take provocative actions.


Third, we agreed to reiterate to our soldiers a policy prohibiting the use of force against members of military liaison missions, whatever the reason.

You read to me a verbatim statement outlining your policies, and I quote:

"During the time of the detention of Foreign Liaison Missions it is strictly prohibited to:

Use physical force or weapons; and search vehicles or liaison team members. No threats are to be made. It is only allowed to speak in response to questions relating to the detention."

Do you reconfirm that this is your policy? Recently, there have been public statements made which have served to confuse the agreements which we reached. Therefore, I consider it necessary that we meet again to resolve these issues prior to the time that our staffs begin the previously agreed coordination. I propose we meet on May 10th at my mission in Potsdam. Alternative dates are May 16th or May 14th respectively.


Glenn K. Otis
General, U.S. Army
Commander in Chief

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

UNCLASSIFIED

13 May 1985

No. 233

Dear General:

Your letter has been studied in detail.

Regarding what you termed "certain lack of clarity which has arisen" on the agreements we made at the 12 April 1985 meeting, I consider it essential to emphasize that it was not the Soviet side which initiated new assertions and formulations concerning the actual circumstances of the incident.

The Soviet position was presented to you with extreme clarity at our last meeting.

I consider it advisable to present it once more.

First. Strict observance by the members of our Military Liaison Missions of the 1947 Huebner-Malinin Agreement reliably guarantees their safety; this Agreement permits members of the Liaison Missions complete freedom of travel "except for places of disposition of military units." The Agreement specifies the procedure for visiting such places thus:

"Each time that any member of the Soviet or US Mission expresses the desire to visit Soviet or US headquarters, military administration offices, forces, units, military schools, a plant or an enterprise under Soviet or US control, an appropriate request must be sent to the Acting Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, US European Command or the Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany."

As the Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany I have taken and continue to take the firm position that the introduction of restricted areas in no way invalidates the concept of "places of disposition of military units." To the contrary, the retention of these two concepts has for 30 years ensured the effectiveness of the 1947 Agreement. Therefore, there is no basis for revising this provision of the Agreement.

Second. I confirm our agreement that members of the Military Missions must not take any provocative actions.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Third. I confirm the proposal of the Soviet side, to which you gave no attention in your letter, on the need for all members of the Military Missions of the four countries to strictly respect the laws of the country where they are located.

Fourth. At our 12 April 1985 meeting we compared the provisions of the Soviet and American directives on the procedure for detaining Mission members and concluded that they practically coincide. The Soviet directive has long been in effect. Its provisions and requirements are briefed regularly to the personnel in the Group. I reconfirm that Soviet servicemen have not, do not, and will continue not to employ physical force or weapons when detaining members of the US Military Mission or those of the other Missions.

At the same time I want to stress that this provision differs from the type of actions to be taken by a sentry on his post (which are clearly defined in military regulations) against intruders who fail to submit to his demands.

This is our position.

I believe it would be advisable, in accordance with the agreement we reached on 12 April, to instruct our staff representatives to begin working out practical measures aimed at coordinating the details of precise implementation by the Liaison Missions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement in order to prevent incidents which may arise in the future. This they should do so as to complete their work in June-July 1985.

It would not seem necessary for us to meet prior to the completion of this work. However, if you believe such a meeting necessary, I agree to one in Potsdam on 16 May 1985.

I fully support your desire to implement most quickly the agreements which we reached. I am convinced that, by taking a responsible approach, we can by our joint efforts work out mutually acceptable measures to promote the development of confidence between our headquarters.

M. ZAYTSEV
General of the Army

TO: General Glenn K. Otis
Commander-in-Chief
US Army-Europe

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

*Главкомандующий
Группой советских войск в Германии*

13 мая 1985 г.

№ 233

Господин генерал,

Ваше письмо детально изучено.

В отношении как Вы выразились "возникших определенных неясностей" по нашим договоренностям на встрече 12 апреля с.г. считаю необходимым подчеркнуть, что не советская сторона явилась инициатором новых заявлений и высказываний относительно действительных обстоятельств инцидента.

Позиция советской стороны с предельной ясностью изложена Вам на последней нашей встрече.

Считаю целесообразным еще раз изложить ее.

Первое. Надежной гарантией безопасности членов наших военных миссий связи является строгое соблюдение ими Соглашения "ХЮБНЕР-МАЛИНИН" 1947 г., которое разрешает членам миссий связи полную свободу передвижения "кроме мест расположения войсковых частей". Это Соглашение так определяет порядок посещения подобных мест:

"Каждый раз, когда какой-либо член Советской или США миссий изъявит желание посетить Советские или США Штабы, отделы военной администрации, соединения, части, военные школы, завод или предприятие, находящееся под советским или США контролем, должна быть послана соответствующая просьба И.о. начальника Штаба Главнокомандующего Европейской Группой войск США или старшему офицеру Штаба Группы Советских Оккупационных войск в Германии".

Как Главнокомандующий Группой советских войск в Германии я придерживался и твердо придерживаюсь той позиции, что введение в практику запретных районов никак не отменяет понятия "места расположения войсковых частей". Напротив, сохранение этих двух понятий вот уже 30 лет обеспечивает действенность Соглашения 1947 года. Поэтому для пересмотра положения этого Соглашения нет никаких оснований.

Второе. Подтверждаю договоренность о том, что члены военных миссий не должны предпринимать никаких провокационных действий.

Третье. Подтверждаю оставленное без внимания в Вашем письме предложение советской стороны о необходимости строгого уважения всеми членами военных миссий четырех государств законов страны пребывания.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

2.

Четвертое. На встрече 12 апреля с.г. мы сравнили положения советской и американской инструкций о порядке задержания членов миссий и пришли к выводу о практически полном их совпадении. Советская инструкция действует давно. Ее положения и требования регулярно доводятся до личного состава Группы. Еще раз подтверждаю, что советские военнослужащие при задержании членов американской военной миссии, как и других миссий не применяли, не применяют и впредь не имеют намерения применять физическую силу или оружие.

Вместе с тем, хочу подчеркнуть, что это положение отличается от порядка действия уголовного на посту (четко определенных воинскими уставами) против нарушителей, не подчиняющихся его требованиям.

Такова наша позиция.

Полагал бы целесообразным в соответствии с достигнутой 12 апреля договоренностью поручить представителям наших штабов приступить к выработке практических мер, направленных на согласование деталей точного выполнения миссиями связи Соглашения "ХЮБНЕР-ЛАТИНИН" в целях предотвращения в будущем возможных инцидентов, с тем, чтобы закончить их разработку в июне-июле 1985 г.

До завершения этой работы можно было бы не проводить наших с Вами встреч. Однако, если Вы считаете такую встречу необходимой, я согласен на нее в Потсдаме 16 мая с.г.

Полностью поддерживаю Ваше стремление к скорейшей реализации достигнутых между нами договоренностей. Убежден, что, проявив ответственный подход, мы сможем совместными силами выработать взаимоприемлемые меры, которые будут способствовать развитию доверия между нашими штабами.



М. ЗАЙЦЕВ

Генерал армии

Генералу Гленну К. ОТИСУ
Главнокомандующему Сухопутными
Силами США в Европе

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, and SEVENTH ARMY
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
APO NEW YORK 09403

UNCLASSIFIED

May 16, 1985

General Mikhail M. Zaytsev
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

Dear General Zaytsev:

Thank you for your letter of 13 May responding to my request for a meeting. After studying the points presented in your letter, I agree that a meeting between us is not necessary prior to staff-level discussions. Conferences between representatives of our staffs to develop specific measures for improving both the conditions under which our liaison missions operate and the cooperation between our commands appear the most useful course.


Accordingly, I am instructing my staff to arrange for these discussions immediately. In particular, I expect the discussions will develop:

-- Procedures to insure the physical safety of all military liaison mission personnel, irrespective of circumstances or conditions.

-- Mutually agreed upon interpretation of movement restrictions of our respective missions.

I propose that our staffs meet on 23 or 24 May 1985 to begin these discussions. I trust one of these dates will be acceptable to you.

Sincerely,


Glenn K. Otis
General, U.S. Army
Commander in Chief

386-A

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE IS BLANK

Un-numbered

APPENDIX C
HUEBNER/MALININ AGREEMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

AGREEMENT

ON MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES COMMANDERS IN CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany", dated November 14, 1944, the United States and the Soviet Commanders in Chief of the zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadripartite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.

2. Missions will be composed of air, navy and army representatives. There will be no political representative.

3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.

4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission".

5. The Chief of the mission will be accredited to the Commander in Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States zone the mission will be accredited to Commander in Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet zone the mission will be accredited to the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

7. In the Soviet zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

UNCLASSIFIED

(Agreement Continued)

9. In the Soviet zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of Soviet or United States mission wants to visit United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24 - 72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and headquarters of their respective Commanders-in-Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communication through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they also will be given facilities such as mail, telephone, telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of a breakdown in the radio installation, the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communication.

12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(Agreement Continued)

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full right of extra-territoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders in Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the mission will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly, as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.


16. This agreement is written in russian and english languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by Deputy Commanders of United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.


Lieutenant-General HUEBNER

Deputy Commander in Chief,
European Command.




General MALININ

Commander in Chief,
Chief of Staff of the Group
of Soviet Occupation Forces
in Germany

5 August 1947

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

USAREUR Reg 550-445
USAFE Reg 30-26

ANNEX A

HUEBNER-MALININ AGREEMENT OF 1947

Agreement

Military Liaison Missions Accredited to the Soviet and United States Commanders
in Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the *Agreement on Control Mechanism in Germany*, November 14, 1944, the US and the Soviet Commanders in Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadripartite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.
2. Missions will be composed of air, navy, and army representatives. There will be no political representative.
3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.
4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission."
5. The Chief of the Mission will be accredited to the Commander in Chief of the occupation forces.
6. In the United States Zone, the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.
7. In the Soviet Zone, the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.
8. In the United States Zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.
9. In the Soviet Zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of Commander in Chief.
10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of Soviet or United States mission wants to visit United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories, and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24-72 hours.

A-1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX A (cont)

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communications with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and headquarters of their respective Commander in Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communication through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they also will be given facilities such as mail, telephone, telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of a breakdown in the radio installation, the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communications.

12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition the respective missions or individual members of the mission may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full right of extraterritoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders in Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the mission will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by Deputy Commanders of United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

/s/ C. R. HUEBNER

/s/ Colonel-General MALININ

/t/ Lieutenant-General HUEBNER
Deputy Commander-in-Chief
European Command

/t/ Colonel-General MALININ
Deputy Commander in Chief
Chief of Staff of the Group of Soviet
Occupation Forces in Germany

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX D
1986 AGREED SUMMARY

AND GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY
STAFF DISCUSSIONS

WITH THE GOAL OF PREVENTING INCIDENTS INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO CINCSFG AND CINCUSAREUR, STAFF REPRESENTATIVES HAVE HELD JOINT DISCUSSIONS ON ENSURING THE SAFETY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF SUCH MISSION MEMBERS. AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. TO CONFIRM THAT THE 1947 HUEBNER-MALININ AGREEMENT REMAINS VALID AND UNCHANGED AND ENSURE THAT ALL ITS PROVISIONS ARE STRICTLY OBSERVED.
2. THAT MILITARY LIAISON MISSION MEMBERS ENJOY SPECIAL STATUS AS A RESULT OF BEING ACCREDITED TO THE RESPECTIVE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF. THEY WILL RESPECT THE LAW AND ORDER OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED AND WILL NOT COMMIT PROVOCATIVE ACTS.
3. THAT ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL BE INSTRUCTED ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF MISSION MEMBERS AND RECEIVE INSTRUCTION CARDS WHICH ADDRESS THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED WITH REGARD TO THEM. AT A MINIMUM, THE CARDS WILL STIPULATE THAT THE USE OF FORCE OR WEAPONS AGAINST MISSION MEMBERS OR THE COMMISSION OF OTHER ACTS WHICH COULD THREATEN THEIR SAFETY IS CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED. THE SEARCH OF MISSION MEMBERS OR THEIR VEHICLES IS ALSO PROHIBITED. MISSION MEMBERS WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY BRIEFED ON THE SPECIAL PROCEDURES WHICH APPLY TO A SENTRY ON HIS POST.
4. TO ESTABLISH SIMILAR PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING DETENTIONS OF MISSION MEMBERS. UPON THE COMPLETION OF AN INVESTIGATION THE DETAINED MISSION MEMBERS WILL BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE THEIR TRAVEL.
5. TO REDUCE ON A MUTUAL BASIS THE PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS (PRA) AND OPEN FOR FREE MOVEMENT BY MISSION MEMBERS THE CITIES WHERE THE MISSIONS ARE LOCATED AND THE ROADS WHICH PROVIDE ENTRANCE TO OR EXIT FROM THEM. WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW PRA MAPS ABOLISH THE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT BY MISSION MEMBERS ALONG AUTOBAHNS AND ROADS WHICH BORDER RESTRICTED AREAS.

THIS SUMMARY IS WRITTEN IN ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN, BOTH TEXTS BEING AUTHENTIC.

Roger Price
ROGER J. PRICE 10 APR 86
MAJOR GENERAL, GENERAL STAFF
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY

Leonid K. Bugrov
LEONID K. BUGROV 10.4.86
GENERAL-MAJOR
FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

I confirm that the English and Russian texts are authentic.

H. Wayne Elliott
H. WAYNE ELLIOTT
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS

UNCLASSIFIED

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛИ ШТАБОВ ГСВГ И СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ

С ЦЕЛЬЮ ПРЕДОТВРАЩЕНИЯ ИНЦИДЕНТОВ С ЧЛЕНАМИ ВОЕННЫХ МИССИЙ СВЯЗИ, АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ПРИ ГК ГСВГ И ГК СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ, ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯМИ ШТАБОВ БЫЛИ ПРОВЕДЕНЫ ПЕРЕГОВОРЫ ПО ВОПРОСАМ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И СВОБОДЫ ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЯ ЧЛЕНОВ ЭТИХ МИССИЙ. В РЕЗУЛЬТАТЕ ЭТИХ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ СТОРОНЫ ДОГОВОРИЛИСЬ О СЛЕДУЮЩЕМ:

1. ПОДТВЕРДИТЬ ДЕЙСТВЕННОСТЬ И НЕИЗМЕННОСТЬ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ "ХЮБНЕР-МАЛИНИН" 1947 ГОДА, ОБЕСПЕЧИТЬ СТРОГОЕ СОБЛЮДЕНИЕ ВСЕХ ЕГО ПОЛОЖЕНИЙ.

2. ЧЛЕНЫ МИССИЙ ИМЕЮТ ОСОБЫЙ СТАТУС, ПОСКОЛЬКУ ОНИ АККРЕДИТОВАНЫ ПРИ СООТВЕТСТВУЮЩИХ ГЛАВНОКОМАНДУЮЩИХ. ОНИ БУДУТ УВАЖАТЬ ЗАКОНЫ И ПОРЯДКИ СТРАНЫ ПРЕБЫВАНИЯ, В КОТОРОЙ ОНИ НАХОДЯТСЯ, И НЕ БУДУТ СОВЕРШАТЬ ПРОВОКАЦИОННЫХ ДЕЙСТВИЙ.


3. ВСЕ ВОЕННОСЛУЖАЩИЕ БУДУТ ПРОИНФОРМИРОВАНЫ О ПРАВОВОМ ПОЛОЖЕНИИ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ И ПОЛУЧАТ ПАМЯТКИ-ИНСТРУКЦИИ О ПОРЯДКЕ ДЕЙСТВИЙ ПО ОТНОШЕНИЮ К НИМ. КАК МИНИМУМ, В ЭТИХ ПАМЯТКАХ ДОЛЖНО БЫТЬ УКАЗАНО, ЧТО ПРОТИВ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ КАТЕГОРИЧЕСКИ ЗАПРЕЩАЕТСЯ ПРИМЕНЯТЬ СИЛУ, СРУЖИЕ ИЛИ СОВЕРШАТЬ ИНЫЕ ДЕЙСТВИЯ, КОТОРЫЕ МОГУТ УГРОЖАТЬ ИХ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ, А ТАКЖЕ ОБЫСКИВАТЬ ЧЛЕНОВ ВМС И ИХ АВТОМАШИНЫ.


ЧЛЕНАМ МИССИЙ БУДЕТ ПОСТОЯННО ДОВОДИТЬСЯ ОСОБЫЙ ПОРЯДОК ДЕЙСТВИЙ ЧАСОВОГО НА ПОСТУ.

4. УСТАНОВИТЬ СХОДНЫЙ ПОРЯДОК РАЗБОРА ЗАДЕРЖАНИЙ ЧЛЕНОВ ВМС. ПОСЛЕ ЗАВЕРШЕНИЯ РАЗБОРА ЗАДЕРЖАННЫМ ЧЛЕНАМ МИССИИ БУДЕТ РАЗРЕШАТЬСЯ ПРОДОЛЖАТЬ ДАЛЬНЕЙШЕЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ.

5. НА ВЗАИМНОЙ ОСНОВЕ СОКРАТИТЬ ПЛОЩАДЬ ПОСТОЯННЫХ ЗАПРЕТНЫХ РАЙОНОВ (ПЗР), ОТКРЫТЬ ДЛЯ СВОБОДНОГО ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЯ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ ГОРОДА, В КОТОРЫХ РАЗМЕШЕНЫ МИССИИ, И ДОРОГИ, ПО КОТОРЫМ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЯЕТСЯ ВЪЕЗД В ЭТИ ГОРОДА И ВЫЕЗД ИЗ НИХ. С ВВЕДЕНИЕМ НОВЫХ КАРТ ПЗР ОТМЕНИТЬ СУЩЕСТВУЮЩИЕ В НАСТОЯЩЕЕ ВРЕМЯ ОГРАНИЧЕНИЯ НА ПЕРЕДВИЖЕНИЕ ЧЛЕНОВ МИССИЙ ПО АВТОБАНАМ И ДОРОГАМ, ЯВЛЯЮЩИМСЯ ГРАНИЦАМИ ЗАПРЕТНЫХ РАЙОНОВ.

ДАННЫЙ ИТГОВЫЙ ДОКУМЕНТ НАПИСАН НА РУССКОМ И АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКАХ, ПРИ ЭТОМ ОБА ТЕКСТА ЯВЛЯЮТСЯ АУТЕНТИЧНЫМИ.


ЛЕОНИД К. БУТРОВ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР
ПЕРВЫЙ ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ НАЧАЛЬНИКА
ШТАБА ГРУППЫ СОВЕТСКИХ ВОЙСК
В ГЕРМАНИИ


РОДЖЕР ДЖ. ПРАЙС 10 apr 86
ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР ГШ
ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ НАЧАЛЬНИКА ШТАБА
СВ США В ЕВРОПЕ И 7-ОЙ АРМИИ
ПО ОПЕРАТИВНЫМ ВОПРОСАМ

I confirm that the English and Russian texts are authentic.

UNCLASSIFIED

397

H. Wayne Elliott
H. WAYNE ELLIOTT
Lieutenant Colonel
S. Doc Advocate General's Corps

THIS PAGE IS BLANK

Un-numbered

APPENDIX E
KEY PARTICIPANTS

KEY PERSONNEL

Ayers, LTG Thomas D.	USAREUR DCINC
Baisden, LaRoy C.	A member of the ACS staff
Barry, MSG Charles	USMLM tour member wounded by Soviet gunshot in Sept 87
Becker, MG F.F.	US Army Surgeon General
Belikov, GEN V.	GSFG Commander in Sep 87
Browder, MAJ Dewey A.	Assistant Political Advisor
Bugrov, GEN-MAJ Leonid K.	Replaced GEN Semyonov as GSFG Deputy Chief of Staff, Dec 85
Burch, Michael	DoD spokesman
Burns, Arthur	US Ambassador to FRG
Burt, Richard	Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, subsequently US Ambassador to FRG
Busch, MAJ C.H.	OCPA, Chief, Command Information Div
Bush, George	US Vice President
Clarke, GEN Bruce C.	CINCUSAREUR during 1962 CINC-TO-CINC meeting
Dittmar, MAJ R.	OCPA, Chief, News Br
Dobrynin, Anatoly F.	Soviet Ambassador in Washington
Elliott, MAJ H. Wayne	OJA, Chief of International Law Div; subsequently appointed a member of the USAREUR negotiating team
Evans, MAJ Clyde L.	USMLM member
Everett, SSG Randy B.	USMLM member

Gambolati, Ronald L.	ODCSI, Chief, Soviet Military Liaison Mission Section, Special Operations B LTC, US Army Reserve; member of negotiating team
Gorbachev, Mikhail	Soviet Premier
Gordon, MG Dudley J.	USAREUR DCSI
Hahn, COL Richard O.	USAREUR Chief of Public Affairs
Halloran, COL William E.	Replaced COL Lajoie as Chief of USMLM in May 86
Hatcher, COL Walter L.	Deputy Commander of 1st PERSCOM; the investigating officer
Hindrichs, CPT Werner S.	US Air Force; USMLM translator on negotiating team
Hodes, GEN Henry I.	CINCUSAREUR, 1956
Hoffman, Fred	DoD spokesman
Holdaway, BG Ronald M.	USAREUR Judge Advocate
Huebner, LTG C.R.	DCINC, European Command, 1947
Johnson, COL Bruce H. Jr.	ODCSI, Chief of HUMINT Operations Br, USAREUR POC to USMLM
Johnson, Robert	Member, Bonn Working Group
Kalb, Bernard	US State Department spokesman
Kelley, LTC Lawrence G.	US Marine Corps, NAVREP at USMLM; translator on negotiating team
Kochemasov, Vyacheslav	Soviet Ambassador to East Germany
Krivosheyev, COL-GEN G.F.	GSFG Chief of Staff

	negotiating team
Lawson, GEN Richard L.	USEUCOM Deputy Commander
Ledford, MG Frank F.	USAREUR Chief Surgeon
Ledsky, Nelson C.	US Embassy Minister
Luferenko, LTC Valeriy G.	A senior GSFG staff officer; designated member of Soviet negotiating team; never participated
Lushev, GEN Pyotr	Replaced GEN Zaytsev in Jul 85 as GSFG CINC
Lyons, MAJ Richard D.	USMLM tour officer
Malinin, COL-GEN	DCINC, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces, 1947
McCutcheon, CPT Bennett	USMLM Air Force tour member accompanying MSG Barry in Sept 87 when Barry was wounded on a tour
McDowell, LTC Robert M.	OCPA, Deputy Chief
McFadden, COL P.L.	CINCUSAREUR's XO
Medved, COL Vladimir E.	Acting Chief of SERB in Aug 85
Mel'nichuk, COL V.P.	GSFG Deputy Procurator
Miller, MAJ Joel D.	OJA; assistant investigating officer
Mitchell, MG John H.	US Berlin Commander
Morgenstern, MAJ Michael A.	Berlin MEDDAC physician
Naumenko, LT D.V.	Soviet translator in 3d staff-level negotiation session
Nicholson, MAJ Arthur D.	USMLM officer shot and killed by Soviet sentry, Mar 85

Ottis, GEN Glenn K.	USAREUR CINC
Pankratov, COL Vladimir	Deputy Chief of SMLM in Frankfurt
Parnell, COL William C. III	USAREUR Secretary of the General Sta (SGS); member of CAT
Pegov, LTC Aleksandr P.	SMLM representative in Frankfurt
Pereverzev, COL Yuriy V.	Chief of SERB; member Soviet negotiating team
Ploen, CPT Jason D.	ODCSI, HUMINT Br support to USMLM
Price, MG Roger J.	From DCSR, replaced MG Stotser as DCSOPS and as leader of US negotiati team
Reagan, Ronald	US President
Rogers, GEN Bernard W.	USCINCEUR; USEUCOM and Supreme Allie Commander, Belgium
Savchenko, MAJ Sergey D.	Translator, Soviet negotiating team
Schatz, SSG Jessie G.	USMLM, MAJ Nicholson's driver
Semyonov, GEN-LT Victor A.	GSFG First Deputy Chief of Staff; member Soviet negotiating team
Serov, GEN-MAJ Y.I.	GSFG's equivalent of Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Shevardnadze, Eduard	Soviet Foreign Minister in Sep 87
Shevtsov, MG Sergei S.	Chief of SMLM in Frankfurt; replaced LTC Luferenko on Soviet negotiating
Shultz, George P.	US Secretary of State
Silva, MAJ James M.	Duty Officer Potsdam House 24 Mar 85
Smith, MAJ Thomas E.	An assistant SGS; a CAT member
Sokolov, Oleg M.	Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor

Styopkin, SR LT Mikhail I.*	Translator, Soviet negotiating team
Tetyakov, LTC Yuriy	A SERB officer; member of Soviet negotiating team
Thurman, GEN Maxwell R.	US Army Vice Chief of Staff
Unruh, CW2 Jerold J.	Special Agent in Charge at the Berlin Criminal Investigation Div
Vessey, GEN John W. Jr.	JCS Chairman
Weinberger, Caspar W.	US Secretary of Defense
Wickham, GEN John A. Jr.	The Army Chief of Staff
Wise, MAJ Robert W.	USMLM
Wyckoff, MAJ Thomas G.	USMLM
Wyckoff, MAJ Claesen D.	USAREUR liaison officer to SMLM-F
Zaytsev, GEN Mikhail M.	GSFG CINC
Zyurin, MAJ Yevgeniy	Soviet translator for concluding session of negotiations

* Soviets have three lieutenant ranks: junior lieutenant, lieutenant, and senior lieutenant.

APPENDIX F
CHRONOLOGY

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

8 Mar

() Tour led by MAJ Robert Wise, part of which occurred in Ludwigslust Training Area. (1,6)

2 Mar

() MAJ Wyckoff gave reconnaissance briefing to MAJ Nicholson; MAJ Nicholson discussed tour with MAJ Wise. (1,6)

4 Mar

1015

() MAJ Nicholson and SSG Schatz departed on tour. (1,6)

1520

() Approximate time tour arrived at Ludwigslust Training Area. (1,7)

1545

() MAJ Nicholson shot and killed by Soviet soldier. (1,10)

1605

() Soviet warrant officer and dozen armed soldiers arrived. (1,11)

1620

() Soldier with medical bag and man in blue jogging suit with sheets and bandages arrived, but neither approached MAJ Nicholson. (1,11)

1650

() The man in jogging suit knelt beside MAJ Nicholson, felt for pulse, and said, "nyet." (1,11)

1730

() Soviet major yelled "Potsdam telephone" to SSG Schatz. SSG Schatz handed blanket out window to an officer who covered MAJ Nicholson. (1,11)

1830

() COL Lajoie informed of the shooting. (1,1)

1840

() Officers and soldiers continued to arrive; SSG Schatz observed helicopter overhead, and heard it land a short distance away. (1,12)

1845

() A Soviet one-star general arrived with interpreter, and interrogated SSG Schatz, while Soviet soldiers tried to open car doors. (1,12)

Mar

- 1910 (S) Arrival of jeep with two men in civilian clothes and two majors. The majors searched and took pictures of MAJ Nicholson's body. (1,13)
- 1938 (S) COL Lajoie, LTC Kelley, and SSG Everett left for Ludwigslust. (1,4)
- 2030 (S) A male in civilian clothes and a Soviet colonel asked SSG Schatz for identification; after seeing colonel's Kommandatura identification, SSG Schatz showed USMLM identification and vehicle pass. After more questions and another attempt to open car doors, they requested he sign a document. (1,13)
- (S) GSFG Chief of Staff, GEN Krivosheyev, using interpreter who spoke Russian with German accent, questioned SSG Schatz. (1,17)
- 2030 (S) Approximate time COL Lajoie's party arrived Ludwigslust. (1,4)
- 2100 (S) COL Lajoie drove onto Ludwigslust Training Area. (1,4)
- 2100 (S) Approximate time Soviets staked out and covered with tarp the sandy area on which MAJ Nicholson had walked to shed. Shortly after, SSG Schatz saw COL Lajoie had arrived. (1,17)
- (S) COL Pereversev, Chief of SERB, took COL Lajoie's party to group of senior Soviet officers led by GEN Krivosheyev. The general launched into a protest accusing MLM mission of being in a PRA, began a personal attack on COL Lajoie, and then halted discussion to search the body of MAJ Nicholson. (1,17)
- (S) Search of body directed by COL Mel'nichuk, GSFG Deputy Procurator. SSG Schatz interrogated in car, with COL Lajoie insisting on his right to refuse to answer, after which SSG Schatz was released. (1,18)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

24 Mar

- 2330 () Approximate time LTC Kelley entered ambulance that contained MAJ Nicholson's body; all Americans departed. (1,21)
- 2358 () COL Lajoie stopped at gas station and called MAJ Silva, the duty officer at Potsdam House. (1,21)

25 Mar

- 0200 () Two USMLM vehicles (COL Lajoie's and MAJ Nicholson's with COL Lajoie driving for SSG Schatz) arrived USMLM headquarters in Berlin. (1,21)
- 0220 () COL Lajoie called HQ USAREUR and gave verbal report to MG Gordon, DCSI. (1,22)
- 0230 () COL Lajoie went to Nicholson house to tell Mrs. Nicholson what had happened. (1,22)
- 0315 () LTC Kelley and MAJ Nicholson's body arrived at Potsdam Morgue. Gates were locked, so he asked to be taken to Potsdam House, where told not to let Soviets perform autopsy on MAJ Nicholson. (1,23)
- 0418 () Doctor (MAJ) Morgenstern from MEDDAC notified he might be sent into East Berlin to witness a medical examination on a US officer's body. (1,24)
- 0500 () LTC Kelley (in ambulance with MAJ Nicholson's body) arrived at morgue again (with MAJ Silva following in USMLM vehicle, to learn exact location of LTC Kelley and the body). (1,23)
- 0830 () Crisis Action Team (CAT) formed under leadership of COL Parnell III, Secretary of the General Staff. (3,44)
- 0900 () Official of US mission in West Berlin lodged a protest at Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. (3,49)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

25 Mar

- 0950 () COL Hahn, USAREUR Chief of Public Affairs, released a statement. USEUCOM subsequently ordered that it would be the only military headquarters in Germany to release information. (2,30)
- () The American Embassy recommended cancellation of US participation in ceremonies for upcoming 40th anniversary of the meeting of US and Soviet Forces at Torgau at end WWII; also recommended direct actions against Soviet military liaison mission to include declaring one or more officers persona non grata (PNG), and imposing temporary restrictions on movements of mission personnel. (3,56)
- () In previously scheduled meeting at Soviet East Berlin Embassy, US Minister Nelson Ledsky discussed the Nicholson incident with two minister-counselors, and the unacceptable response of Soviet Embassy official that morning. (3,49)
- 1000 () USMLM insisted imperative Gen Otis send protest letter as soon as possible to his counterpart at GSFG, and sent input for protest letter to HQ USAREUR. (3,50)
- () American Embassy in Bonn urged Secretary of State to call in the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, and convey to Soviets the seriousness of incident. (3,55)
- 1015 () Detained at Glienicke Bridge over 3 hours, Dr. Morgenstern and driver, SSG Everett, proceeded to Soviet military hospital in Potsdam and joined LTC Kelley in examination room. (1,24)
- 1110 () COL Mel'nichuk arrived at Soviet military hospital and the joint Soviet-American examination began. (1,24)
- 1115 () COL Pankratov and party, of SMLM in Frankfurt, reported to Chief of Staff, HQ USAREUR, Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg. (3,46)
- 1200 (U) Department of State issued statement at daily noon briefing. (2,31)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

25 Mar

- 1220 () Body transferred to morgue. (1,24)
- 1355 () Message from Gen Otis, CINC, demanding return of MAJ Nicholson's body, delivered to Soviet MLM, Frankfurt. (1,26)
- 1400 () Investigating officer, COL Walter Hatcher, Deputy Commander, 1st PERSCOM, was briefed. (4,83)
- 1515 (U) Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt held an on-the-record briefing. (2,31)
- 1600 () HQ USAREUR's expanded version of USMLM's protest letter for GEN Otis forwarded to USEUCOM and American Embassy in Bonn. (3,51)
- () LTC Kelley, Dr. Morgenstern, and the Soviets gathered to sort out paperwork; Americans refused to sign report, but did not object to report saying they had been present. (1,26)
- 1715 () The ambulance carrying MAJ Nicholson's body passed out of Soviet control on Glienicke Bridge. (1,27)
- () At GEN Otis' direction, Sergeant Schatz was debriefed by members of 766th Mil Intel Det. (4,83)
- 2200 (U) MAJ Nicholson's body departed Berlin after plane-side ceremony and was met in Frankfurt by honor guard led by MG Fiala. (2,38)
- () Interagency Group in Washington, chaired by Secretary of State, Richard Burt, coordinated protests, and developed other appropriate responses. (3,49)

26 Mar

- 0052 () State Department wired agreement to USAREUR on protest letter for GEN Otis. (3,52)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

26 Mar

- () Official investigation into MAJ Nicholson's death officially commenced led by COL Hatcher, Deputy Commander of 1st PERSCOM and assisted by MAJ Miller, OJA, and CW2 Unruh, Special Agent in Charge at Berlin CID. (4,84)
- 0835Z () USEUCOM forwarded the protest letter for GEN Otis to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) without changes. (3,51)
- () USEUCOM elaborated on Embassy's recommendations of 25 March and added several others. (3,56)
- 0928 () American Embassy at Bonn sent concurrence on GEN Otis' protest letter. (3,52)
- 1330 () Three Allied military headquarters in West Germany held tripartite conference in Heidelberg. British and French to send protest letters and agreed on other sanctions. (3,57)
- 1829Z (U) Tripartite proposals sent out by USAREUR to the Embassy and USEUCOM. (3,58)
- 2112Z (U) Embassy staffed and forwarded Tripartite proposals. (3,58)
- 2128 () JCS changes to protest letter for GEN Otis arrived USAREUR HQ. (3,51)

27 Mar

- 0850Z (U) Tripartite proposals sent by USAREUR forwarded by USEUCOM. (3,58)
- () USEUCOM and American Embassy in Bonn agreed with most of tripartite conference's proposals. (3,58)
- () Assistant Secretary Richard Burt called in Oleg Solokov, the number two official at Soviet Embassy, for 40-minute review of situation. (3,50)
- (U) Off-the-record background briefing for media held by Mr. Burt and other officials. (2,31)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

27 Mar

(U) Soviets printed their version of incident in TASS.
(2,32)

1855 (U) Mr. Robert Johnson, a member of Bonn Working Group, called MAJ Dewey Browder, USAREUR Assistant Polad, and informed him the Interagency Group had approved all the proposals, except no surveillance and no time limit on the Soviet response to letters of protest. (3,59)

1930 () COL Parnell received telephone call from USEUCOM. USAREUR made preparations to restrict SMLM members to compounds as of midnight. (3,60)

2200 () All three Soviet military liaison missions notified of their temporary restriction to compounds. (3,60)

28 Mar

0435Z (U) JCS message to USEUCOM did not "info" USAREUR. (3,59)

0515Z (U) USAREUR's first message traffic on important decisions arrived as an "info" addressee on State Department's messages to Embassy. (3,59)

() Senior Soviet military attaches to the three US service branches summoned by Interagency Group in Washington to receive verbal protests. (3,50)

() Washington Interagency Group considered tripartite proposals and informed Embassy and USEUCOM of concurrence on most of proposals, but deferred decision to PNG SMLM members pending assessment of Soviet response to protest letters. (3,58)

1024 (U) USEUCOM retransmitted to USAREUR message from JCS. (3,59)

1145Z (U) USEUCOM sent two-sentence implementing message to USAREUR. (3,59)

() Interagency Group met to review actions taken and to develop game plan. (3,60)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

28 Mar

2050Z (U) JCS tasking message had suspense of "opening of business Washington time" on 29 Mar, which was approx 1330 local time in Germany. (3,63)

(U) Multinational memorial service in Berlin with over 400 guests joining LTG Ayers, Deputy CINCUSAREUR, to honor MAJ Nicholson and mourn his loss. (2,38)

29 Mar

0920Z (U) USEUCOM's proposed options forwarded by message to GEN Otis in US. He responded by phone. (3,63)

() Plane-side honor ceremony before MAJ Nicholson's body departed Rhein-Main Air Base. (3,53)

() At USAREUR HQ, GEN Fiala delivered GEN Otis' protest letter to GEN Sergei Shevtsov, Chief of SMLM in Frankfurt. (3,53)

() Chaotic meeting between COL Lajoie and GEN Krivosheyev, GSFG Chief of Staff representing the GSFGCINC in East Germany. (3,53)

() American Embassy briefed FRG Foreign Office on developments and initial sanctions. (3,60)

() The "possible response options" of Office of Secretary of Defense and Office of JCS (which included USAREUR and USEUCOM suggestions) provided to Inter-agency Group (one day prior to USEUCOM submission). (3,63)

1415 () British Army headquarters in FRG presented protest letter to SMLM. (3,55)

1510Z (U) USAREUR's official response to JCS tasker. (3,63)

1600 () British Deputy Chief delivered protest letter to Soviet officer translator at SERB, since no senior Soviet officers available. (3,55)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

30 Mar

- 1000 () French delivered protest letter to Chief of SERB. (3,55)
- () Meeting between Secretary of State George P. Schultz and Ambassador Dobrynin covering entire range of US-Soviet bilateral relations, to include the shooting of MAJ Nicholson. Agreement reached that the two commanders in Germany would hold a meeting. (3,55)
- 1200 () French Army headquarters in FRG protest letter given to SMLM in Baden-Baden. (3,55)
- 1245Z () USEUCOM staffed and sent its options to JCS a day after JCS had staffed and sent its options to GEN Otis. (3,62-63)
- () Funeral at Arlington National Cemetery. (3,55)

1 Apr

- () Interagency Group met and recommended the two commanders meet at early date. (3,65)
- () GEN Fiala, USAREUR Chief of Staff, sent a plan (and a proposed CINC-meeting agenda) to GEN Otis for early meeting between USMLM and SERB to set up a CINC-to-CINC meeting. (4,77)
- () GEN Gordon, ODCSI, directed American personnel be polite but distant, courteous but avoid provocation and unnecessary contact with Soviets. (4,111)

2 Apr

- (U) At news briefing, Secretary Weinberger publicly spoke, for first time, of requirement for an apology from Soviets. (3,65)
- () State Department formally announced cancellation of 25 April joint ceremonies with Soviets at Torgau. (3,66)
- () GEN Gordon, DCSI, instructed USMLM to conduct operations with discretion and no provocations. (3,66)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

2 Apr

(U) BG Holdaway, USAREUR Judge Advocate, forwarded memorandum on "The Huebner-Malinin Agreement." (4,101)

(U) Tree planting ceremony at Ft Belvoir to create living memorial in honor of MAJ Nicholson. (2,41)

3 Apr

() Two objectives for negotiations emerging: GSFG action to prevent future violence, and no reduction of right of free access in East Germany. (4,78)

(U) USAREUR Judge Advocate, BG Holdaway, sent memorandum on "The Use of Force by Soviet and US Guards," written by MAJ Elliott, Chief of International Law Division. (4,101)

4 Apr

(U) DoD spokesman, Michael Burch, said he did not know if apology was necessary before a meeting between the US and Soviet commanders. (4,74)

(U) Secretary Weinberger said some form of Soviet compensation for Mrs. Nicholson was vital. (4,74)

() USEUCOM forwarded to Washington a list of pros and cons of CINC-to-CINC meeting. (4,78)

5 Apr

() Limited tour conducted by USMLM. (3,66)

(U) Recognizing discussions would have international implications, USAREUR appointed MAJ Elliott a member of negotiating team. (4,101)

(U) USAREUR HQ reminded subordinate units to conduct detentions according to regulations without endangering life or property, and to render proper courtesy and respect to SMLM personnel. (3,66)

(U) Announcement that apology and compensation not a precondition for meeting between commanders. (4,74)

6 Apr

() COL Pereversev, Chief of SERB, delivered non-paper from GEN Zaytsev saying he agreed to meet with GEN Otis to completely close the incident. (4,79)

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u> (Chapter, Page)
	1985
<u>7 Apr</u>	() Memorandum sent from President Reagan to Secretary Weinberger on advisability of a CINC-to-CINC meeting, and outlined goals. (4,75)
<u>8 Apr</u>	() Normal full-tour schedule by USMLM implemented but carefully controlled. (3,66)
<u>9 Apr</u>	() JCS informed USEUCOM and USAREUR that Secretary Weinberger had approved CINC-to-CINC meeting, and directed that plans for timing, venue, and meeting details be developed and sent to JCS for Secretary Weinberger's approval. (4,77)
	() A "reliable Western journalist in Bonn with good contacts with the Soviet Embassy" said he had been informed the soldier who shot MAJ Nicholson was arrested and brought up on charges; not confirmed by US intelligence agencies who speculated it was a "controlled leak." (4,85)
	() Team investigating death of MAJ Nicholson completed findings. (4,84)
<u>10 Apr</u>	() GEN Zaytsev's response to GEN Otis' protest letter delivered by Chief of SMLM GEN Shevtsov to GEN Fiala (GEN Otis in US). GEN Shevtsov proposed preliminary meeting be held by CINCs' staffs to determine discussion subjects. (4,80)
	() USAREUR preparing plan for USEUCOM approval for CINC-TO-CINC meeting when told by USEUCOM to keep it "informed" on plans for the meeting. (4,86)
	() GEN Fiala letter to GEN Zaytsev (acknowledging his letter which was forwarded to GEN Otis) said GEN Otis instructed that a preliminary staff meeting not necessary; a CINC-to-CINC meeting should be held as soon as possible after noon on 11 April. (4,81)
<u>11 Apr</u>	
1125	() COL Pereversev gave COL Lajoie a response from GSFG Chief of Staff (in which he repeated his desire for preliminary staff meeting) and said GEN Zaytsev expected a personal response from GEN Otis to his proposals. (4,81)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

11 Apr

() GEN Bruce C. Clarke, CINCUSAREUR during 1962 CINC-TO-CINC meeting, recommended staff check records of 1962 meeting, echoing suggestion by COL Pereversev earlier in day. (4,86)

1300

() Briefed on contents of GEN Zaytsev's letter, GEN Otis (returned from US) sent second letter accepting offer of a personal meeting, and proposed today or at the latest on 12 April. (4,82)

() USAREUR's chief historian tasked to provide information on 1962 CINC-TO-CINC meeting. (4,86)

1755

() COL Lajoie delivered GEN Otis' letter to SERB, and was assured GEN Zaytsev would make expeditious decision about the meeting. (4,83)

12 Apr

() Strategy formulated by GEN Otis for conducting meeting; prepared to meet immediately with GEN Zaytsev if response positive. (4,88)

1200

() COL Lajoie informed GEN Zaytsev agreed to meet with GEN Otis between 1700 and 1800. (4,88)

1650

() GEN Otis' plane landed in Berlin. (4,89)

1750

() Waved through Glienicke Bridge without formalities, GEN Otis met by honor guard on other side. (4,89)

1800

() First half of CINC-TO-CINC meeting between GEN Otis and GEN Zaytsev began at Soviet Officers Club in East Berlin, until 2000. (4,89)

2040

() Second portion of CINC-TO-CINC meeting began at USMLM's Potsdam House, until 2215. (4,97)

13 Apr

(U) USAREUR sent Washington a recommended news release and possible questions and answers for briefing media. (4,98)

(U) Joint State-Defense press guidance confirmed the meeting and future discussions with the Soviets, but had no comment to questions. (4,98)

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u> (Chapter, Page)
	1985
<u>15 Apr</u>	(U) State Department presented a more complete picture of CINCs' meeting and announced another meeting soon. (4,99)
	() Allied Tripartite Rapid Reaction Committee created, capable of convening within 48 hours. (4,103)
<u>16 Apr</u>	(U) Official US Government version of CINC meeting presented in interagency press release. (4,99)
	(U) MAJ Elliott, OJA, memorandum on "restricted areas," warned against inadvertently creating a binding "customary rule of international law." (4,102)
<u>17 Apr</u>	(U) MAJ Elliott memorandum addressed possibility of Soviets unilaterally terminating Huebner-Malinin Agreement and closing missions. (4,102)
<u>18 Apr</u>	() GEN Otis letter to GEN Zaytsev proposed staff discussions begin no later than 15 May and have follow-up CINC-TO-CINC meeting in June or July. (4,102)
	() GEN Fiala briefed Chairman of JCS and GEN Lawson, USEUCOM Deputy Commander. (4,103)
	() GEN Vessey informed GEN Fiala that Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz agreed on no further CINC-TO-CINC discussions until change in Soviet policy on apology and compensation. Staff discussions allowed only to develop procedures to prevent future incidents. Soviets told the next move up to them. (4,103)
	() GEN Otis instructed MG Mitchell, Berlin Commander, to be polite but distant with no unnecessary contacts. (4,106)
<u>22 Apr</u>	(U) Soviet Embassy in Washington issued press statement contradicting American 16 Apr press statement which said Soviets pledged not to use force against liaison mission members. Soviets made same assertions at State Department meeting. State Department surprised and puzzled by unacceptable Soviet interpretation of the issue. (4,104)

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u> (Chapter, Page)
	1985
<u>23 Apr</u>	(U) News story alleged MAJ Nicholson performed earlier "spy mission," and that members of Western MLMs fumed for risk-taking. (4,104)
<u>24 Apr</u>	(U) GEN Otis agreed with BG Holdaway's memorandum that OJA be involved in the staff discussions. (4,101)
<u>25 Apr</u>	<p>(U) In interview with American newspaper, GEN Zaytsev said Soviet sentry was "fulfilling his duty" by shooting, and that US version of the CINC meeting was "a distortion." (4,108)</p> <p>(U) Soviet-sponsored ceremony commemorating the WWII linkup of US and Soviet forces at Torgau on the Elbe. (4,108)</p> <p>(U) A joint group of US and Soviet veterans announced a campaign to celebrate "Elbe Day" every year on April 25th. (4,108)</p> <p>() Arthur Burns, US Ambassador to FRG, met with Vyacheslav Kochemasov, Soviet Ambassador to East Germany, and made a personal, nonpolitical suggestion that the Soviets send note of condolence to MAJ Nicholson's widow, which was refused. (4,108)</p>
<u>26 Apr</u>	<p>() Interagency Group's response to Soviet 22 April press statement sent to State and Defense departments for implementation. (4,107)</p> <p>(U) Secretary of State Burt called in a Soviet Embassy official to emphasize US unhappiness with Soviet response, to demand clarification of the 22 April Soviet statement, and to raise issues as instructed by Interagency Group, including declaring a Soviet assistant military attache persona non grata (PNG). (4,107)</p> <p>() COL Lajoie cautioned that part of controversy might not be over what was actually said at CINCs' meeting but over the interpretation by both sides. (4,112)</p>

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

28 Apr

() USAREUR asked higher HQ for clarification about staff discussions, and forwarded a proposed letter (from GEN Fiala to GSFG Chief of Staff) suggesting staff discussions begin on 15 May. (4,109)

29 Apr

() GEN Vessey, responding to 28 Apr USAREUR request for clarification, sent instructions to prepare a letter from GEN Otis to GEN Zaytsev requesting early CINC-TO-CINC meeting. He outlined actions of State Department, and directed USAREUR resume overt surveillance of SMLM. (4,109)

30 Apr

() USAREUR forwarded GEN Otis' proposed letter (to GEN Zaytsev) to higher HQ. Message asked guidance on US policy about Soviet attendance at upcoming national holiday celebrations, about US Allied attendance at SMLM's celebration of V-E Day, and about special rations for Soviets for the occasion, recommending minimal support and participation. (4,110)

() USEUCOM and GEN Vessey concurred with proposed letter, the USAREUR plan for minimum support for the Soviets' V-E Day celebration, and exclusion of Soviets from Independence Day celebrations. (4,110)

() Deputy Chief of SERB asked LTC Kelley why Soviets had received no response to protests about restrictions and reductions in rations; LTC Kelley recommended caution to avoid Soviet retaliation, that they be told their requests were "under study." (4,111)

() CINCUSAREUR added restrictive touring guidance to USMLM's SOP, replacing GEN Gordon's 1 April informal instructions. (4,111)

() State Department in Washington called in Soviet Embassy official and presented a claim for compensation on behalf of MAJ Nicholson's family. Official refused to accept, but promised to convey contents to Moscow. (4,112)

() GEN Gordon recommended HQ USAREUR begin creating negotiating team, representative of interested elements of USAREUR staff, for staff discussions with Soviets. (6,137)

DATE/TIME

EVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985.

1 May

() USEUCOM reviewed Soviet public statements on the incident, and said the US should publicly refute these and other Soviet claims. (4,112)

() Soviets released statement in TASS which absolved the guard of misconduct and did not offer apology or compensation. It seemed to signal a wish to avoid further escalation of controversy by a public reiteration of Soviet pledge not to use weapons against USMLM personnel. (4,114)

() In a letter to GEN Zaytsev, GEN Otis outlined his understanding of what had been accomplished at their first meeting, and requested early meeting to confirm agreements. (4,113)

2 May

() GEN Otis' 1 May letter delivered simultaneously to SERB in Potsdam and SMLM in Frankfurt. (4,113)

() At meeting to receive GEN Otis' letter, GEN Shevtsov raised question of sanctions and tried to reestablish good working relationship SMLM had previously enjoyed. (4,113)

() Sanction of continuous, overt surveillance of SMLM tour vehicles being reimposed today. (4,114)

() GEN Fiala approved GEN Gordon's preliminary plan for negotiating team. (6,137)

5 May

(U) GEN Zaytsev letter answered BAOR commander's letter of protest. (4,115)

10 May

() COL Lajoie recommended himself as leader for negotiating team to GEN Gordon, and that USMLM members make up majority of team; that other USAREUR staff elements organize a working group to serve as point of contact or conduit. (6,138)

13 May

(U) GEN Zaytsev letter, responding to GEN Otis' 1 May letter, stated both sides had policies against using force against MLM members, and agreed to a meeting on 16 May. (4,116)

DATE/TIME

EVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

13 May (U) GEN Otis recommended US side accept GEN Zaytsev's statement of renunciation of force against MLM members, not hold another CINC meeting now, and that staff discussions focus on developing measures to preclude recurrences of violent incidents. (4,116)

14 May (U) Predicting extreme difficulty and frustration in negotiations with Soviets, COL Lajoie recommended focus on resolving conflicting accounts of the incident, reducing PRAs, agreeing to absolute prohibition of use of force against Allied MLM personnel, and official recognition of observer status for MLM members. (6,141)

15 May (U) JCS agreed staff-level discussions more appropriate than another CINC meeting and requested proposed agenda be reviewed in Washington prior to presentation to Soviets. (4,117)

(U) COL Lajoie submitted four considerations to guide US side in negotiations. (6,142)

(U) JCS suggested USAREUR begin staff-level discussions on 16 May. USAREUR proposed 23-24 May for time to coordinate with Allies; Washington approved delay. (6,143)

16 May (U) GEN Otis' letter instructed staff to arrange staff-level discussions and proposed they begin on 23 or 24 May. (4,117)

17 May (U) GEN Otis' 16 May letter delivered simultaneously to SMLM and SERB. (4,117)

(U) JCS concurred with USAREUR's proposed topics for staff discussions and added two more. (6,143)

20 May (U) GEN Zaytsev agreed to begin staff discussions on 23 or 24 May, preferring preliminary meeting on 23 May before first official meeting on 24 May; expected both sides provide written agenda. (4,117)

21 May (U) Secretary Weinberger one-day visit to Berlin to visit Mrs. Nicholson and to reemphasize US demands for apology and compensation. (6,145)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

21 May

() USAREUR HQ hosted tripartite conference in Heidelberg in which proposed agenda and objectives for negotiations coordinated with Allies. (6,145)

() COL Lajoie continued to confer closely with counterparts at British and French MLMs in East Germany. (6,146)

22 May

() List of proposed negotiation team members forwarded from USAREUR to USEUCOM. (6,140)

() GEN Otis met with negotiating team, was briefed on preparations, and reviewed results of the 21 May tripartite conference. (6,146)

() Decision not to present Soviets a written protocol; it could lead to restrictions on USMLM operations. Allies wanted no changes to existing MLM agreements. (6,147)

24 May

() Lengthy preliminary meeting between COL Lajoie and COL Pereverzev; lists of negotiating teams exchanged and first session set for 5 June. (6,148)

29 May

() At second preliminary meeting, COL Lajoie and COL Pereverzev attempted to determine location and host for first meeting, and resolve Soviet objections to Nicholson incident as agenda item. (6,150)

30 May

() A small villa at USMLM's Potsdam compound dedicated "Villa Nicholson." (6,155)

31 May

() Third preliminary meeting to resolve rotation issue. (6,152)

() GEN Otis met with members of USAREUR negotiating team and CAT. (6,153)

Jun

() Prior to 5 June meeting, GEN Price and Heidelberg portion of negotiating team flew to Berlin to join USMLM portion of team for briefings. (6,155)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

4 Jun

1600

() COL Pereverzev called COL Lajoie to ask for any new proposals, and stated the small villa at USMLM's Potsdam compound not acceptable meeting site because renamed "Villa Nicholson." (6,155)

() GEN Price and negotiating team drafted proposed memo for GEN Otis to GEN Zaytsev recommending first session for 13 June at Frankfurt Officers Club. (6,156)

() British MLM tour rammed, bricks and shovels thrown at vehicle, Soviet soldiers threatened to shoot anyone leaving vehicle, and equipment stolen by Soviet soldiers. Soviet response to British protest denied Soviet guilt and accused British of ramming Soviet vehicle. (6,158)

5 Jun

() GEN Fiala asked GEN Mitchell, Berlin Commander, for comments about USAREUR's interpretation of JCS' guidance on social contacts with Soviets. (7,196)

6 Jun

() GEN Otis' memorandum to GEN Zaytsev delivered simultaneously to SERB and SMLM-F. (6,157)

7 Jun

() British Queen's Birthday ceremonies in Berlin. (6,158)

() GEN Rogers briefed by COL Lajoie on upcoming negotiations and British MLM incident. (6,159)

11 Jun

() GEN Zaytsev agreed to Frankfurt Officers Club for first session, but 14 rather than 13 June. GEN Shevtsov, Chief of SMLM, would replace LTC Luferenko on Soviet team. (6,159)

() USAREUR notified USEUCOM and American Embassy in Bonn of GSFG's agreement to meet in Frankfurt, and of USAREUR's agreement to date change. (6,159)

() MAJ Nicholson posthumously promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. (6,183)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

12 Jun

- 1700Z () USEUCOM informed JCS of scheduled place and date for negotiation session. (6,159)
- () Representatives from USMLM and Allied Contact Section in Frankfurt met Soviet counterparts. (6,159)
- () MAJ Wyckoff met with SMLM representative, COL Pegov. (6,160)

13 Jun

- 1645 () SMLM staff greeted GSFG negotiators at SMLM compound in Frankfurt. (6,160)
- () GEN Maxwell Thurman, US Army Chief of Staff, asked about renaming Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin in honor of MAJ Nicholson. (6,183)
- () USAREUR agreed with GEN Mitchell and recommended to USEUCOM that US invite Soviet civilians and Soviet military whose functions pertained to Berlin, and not GSFG personnel, to Berlin's 4th of July functions. (7,199)

14 Jun

- 0955 () First session of USAREUR-GSFG staff level negotiations began. (6,160)

15 Jun

- () USEUCOM and Bonn Embassy concurred with USAREUR's recommendation regarding invitations of Soviets to Berlin's 4th of July celebrations. (7,199)

20 Jun

- () COL Pereverzev informed COL Lajoie and LTC Kelley the Soviets would host second session on 1 July at Soviet Officers Club in Potsdam. (7,190)

21 Jun

- () COL Lajoie sent recommendations for next session of staff negotiations to GEN Price. (7,192)

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u> (Chapter, Page)
	1985
<u>21 Jun</u>	() Tripartite conference with British and French; all agreed to continue sanctions until end of negotiations. (7,193)
<u>24 Jun</u>	() MAJ Wyckoff and GEN Shevtsov met and discussed SMLM matters. (7,194)
	() GEN Price message to GEN Otis proposed GEN Price and GEN Semyonov initial an agreed summary and CINCs or chiefs of staff sign summary. (7,195)
	() GEN Mitchell again asked for JCS guidance about inviting Soviets to 4th of July. (7,199)
<u>26 Jun</u>	() GEN Otis informed GEN Price that SMLM restrictions would be lifted when Secretary Weinberger and GEN Vessey satisfied apology and compensation issues resolved. (7,195)
<u>27 Jun</u>	() GEN Otis met Secretary Weinberger and GEN Vessey to discuss upcoming negotiating session. Secretary Weinberger gave GEN Otis permission to terminate overt surveillance of Soviet MLM vehicles when he thought appropriate. (7,236)
<u>28 Jun</u>	() JCS concurred; Secretary Weinberger approved inviting Soviet civilians and Soviet military personnel assigned to quadripartite agencies in Berlin to 4th of July celebrations. (7,199)
<u>1 Jul</u>	
1000	() Second session of USAREUR-GSFG staff negotiations began at Soviet Officers Club in Potsdam, followed by luncheon; US representatives departed at 1500 for West Berlin. (7,199)
<u>2 Jul</u>	() LTC Gambolati briefed representatives from BAOR HQ on results of second session. (7,220)
<u>4 Jul</u>	() LTC Gambolati briefed FFA representatives on second session and on his meeting with BAOR representatives. (7,220)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

8 Jul () COL Lajoie told GEN Gordon, DCSI, it might become necessary to separate the issues of MLM security from PRA coverage in negotiations. (7,221)

() JCS told USEUCOM to ensure USAREUR did not formally agree to or sign an agreement with GSFG without getting JCS approval. (7,222)

9 Jul () Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt met with Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor Solokov and again raised issues of apology and compensation. (7,222)

10 Jul () COL Lajoie met with COL Pereverzev at SERB offices to formulate a summary of negotiations. (7,223)

13 Jul

0015 () On COL Lajoie's first USMLM tour since the shooting, tour vehicle rammed by Soviet truck, injuring COL Lajoie. (7,224)

0225 () SERB representative and Potsdam Kommandant arrived at Potsdam House where USMLM crew had driven after the ramming. (7,225)

15 Jul () LTC Kelley, acting Chief of USMLM, met with Chief of SERB, COL Pereverzev, to verbally protest ramming incident and COL Lajoie's injury. (7,225)

16 Jul () Mr. Burt called in Mr. Solokov to protest the ramming and questioned whether the USAREUR-GSFG discussions were having desired effect of preventing such incidents. He also questioned Soviet authorities' control of Soviet military. (7,226)

() USAREUR forwarded to USEUCOM a proposed chief-of-staff-level letter of protest to GSFG for approval. (7,226)

(U) First report of ramming incident appeared in Berlin newspaper, with American wire services picking it up the next day. (7,227)

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u> (Chapter, Page)
1985	
<u>17 Jul</u>	() USEUCOM forwarded proposed protest letter to JCS and recommended action to formally protest the ramming and resultant injury. (7,234)
	() JCS queried USEUCOM about apparent disparity between USAREUR reports of the ramming, which implied an accident, and USAREUR protest letter calling it a deliberate ramming. (7,227)
<u>18 Jul</u>	() Meeting with LTC Kelley, COL Pereverzev stated Soviet soldiers completely at fault in ramming incident and would be punished. He also requested confidentiality from press on his statements in meetings. (7,228)
<u>19 Jul</u>	() In message to GEN Gordon, COL Lajoie responded to GEN Otis' concern and his proposal that USMLM crews immediately accept detentions. (7,230)
	() GEN Gordon supported COL Lajoie's contention that USMLM should not immediately submit at first sign of a detention; GEN Otis agreed. (7,231)
<u>22 Jul</u>	() GEN Shevtsov delivered to GEN Fiala a farewell letter from GEN Zaytsev and a letter from his replacement, GEN Pyotr Lushev, announcing he was assuming command of GSFG. (7,231)
<u>23 Jul</u>	(U) Mr. Fred Hoffman, the DoD spokesman, briefed news media that the ramming may have been accidental. (7,231)
<u>24 Jul</u>	() Meeting with COL Lajoie, COL Pereverzev displeased with DoD and State Department news releases and did not appreciate seeing his words repeated for public scrutiny. COL Lajoie addressed the wording to be used in concluding document, and COL Pereverzev spoke of exchanging PRA maps. (7,232)
	() GEN Fiala forwarded to USEUCOM a toned-down protest letter, in response to Soviet acceptance of responsibility for ramming incident. (7,234)
	() USEUCOM concurred with GEN Fiala's revised protest letter and forwarded to JCS; it would be delivered on 25 July unless USEUCOM advised to the contrary. (7,234)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

24 Jul

() JCS agreed protest letter be treated as routine response, but added a sentence to tie incident to ongoing staff discussions and, with minor revisions, approved delivery on 25 July. (7,234)

26 Jul

1000

() GEN Fiala's protest letter delivered to SERB by LTC Kelley. (7,234)

1540

() Chief of SMLM-F escorted to GEN Fiala's office to receive protest letter with GEN Fiala's request that GEN Shevtsov personally convey letter and his words to GEN Krivosheyev. (7,235)

() GEN Fiala announced that overt surveillance of SMLM vehicles, "Operation Remembrance 85," would terminate at 2400. (7,236)

1745Z

() USAREUR HQ reported results of the two delivery meetings (GEN Fiala's protest letter) to USEUCOM. (7,236)

29 Jul

1230Z

() USEUCOM relayed results of the two delivery meetings (GEN Fiala's protest letter) to JCS. (7,236)

() COL Lajoie met with COL Pereverzev to discuss concluding formulations for negotiations. (8,242)

31 Jul

() After being briefed on Soviet concluding formulations, Allies responded with reservations about wording in several parts of text. (8,248)

1 Aug

() GEN Gordon forwarded changes to formulations to COL Lajoie, for the 2 August meeting with COL Pereverzev. (8,249)

2 Aug

() MAJ Wyckoff met at SMLM-F compound with GEN Shevtsov who had list of comments and requests from GEN Krivosheyev for GEN Fiala. (8,248)

() COL Lajoie met with COL Pereverzev to discuss text of concluding negotiations. (8,249)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

8 Aug () GEN Otis gave USAREUR staff additional guidance on USAREUR-GSFG negotiations. (8,250)

() COL Medved, Acting Chief of SERB, requested a meeting with COL Lajoie, to respond to US side's 2 August suggested changes to text. (8,250)

(U) GEN Otis sent clear message about news "black-outs" when he discussed USAREUR-GSFG negotiations in a press interview. (8,252)

13 Aug () GEN Gordon forwarded "final US position" on formulations to COL Lajoie for comment. Before COL Lajoie could comment on the "final US position," COL Medved requested a 14 Aug meeting. (8,253)

14 Aug () Hoping for acceptable compromise to USAREUR's objections to prior text, COL Medved presented a revised text of formulations to COL Lajoie. (8,254)

15 Aug () COL Lajoie presented GEN Otis' welcome letter to GEN Lushev at GSFG HQ. (8,252)

16 Aug () GEN Shevtsov told MAJ Wyckoff that GEN Lushev was intent on resolving negotiation problems because of upcoming summit meeting. (8,256)

18 Aug (U) Mrs. Nicholson accepted Veterans of Foreign Wars "Man of the Year" Award for MAJ Nicholson. (8,258)

22 Aug () Staff analysis of 14 August, GSFG-proposed formulation resulted in a counter-proposal USAREUR believed would strike an acceptable balance. (8,258)

28 Aug () USEUCOM concurred with wording of the USAREUR-proposed text, requested it be submitted to GSFG immediately, and authorized USAREUR to coordinate with Allies. (8,261)

() USAREUR provided copies of GSFG and USAREUR versions of formulations to British and French, with rationale for changing GSFG text. (8,262)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1985

29 Aug () COL Lajoie gave COL Medved a copy of USAREUR's proposed text for the concluding document. (8,262)

6 Sep () COL Pereverzev said USAREUR's text had inconsistencies and omissions; GSFG staff had written another text, putting back the "sentry on his post" statement. (8,262)

7 Sep () USMLM tour detained after becoming disabled; Soviet vehicle grazed fender and scraped the side of stationary USMLM vehicle, Soviet soldier pointed rifle when tour officer attempted to leave vehicle, USMLM vehicle towed to mission restriction sign for picture taking, and Soviet kommandant took 6 hours to arrive. (8,267)

9 Sep () COL Medved presented COL Lajoie with GSFG's official protest of 7 Sep incident claiming the USMLM driver was driving recklessly. COL Lajoie presented written protest to Soviets. (8,267)

1950Z () USEUCOM notified JCS of 7 Sep detention and COL Lajoie's protest. (8,269)

11 Sep () COL Lajoie delivered copy of new USAREUR proposed text to COL Medved, who would deliver to GSFG HQ. (8,266)

12 Sep () GEN Fiala instructed USMLM to restrict incident and detention reporting to within USAREUR. (8,269)

15 Sep (U) Secretary Weinberger stated on television that USMLM personnel had been held at gunpoint. (8,269)

17 Sep () Soviet press responded to Secretary Weinberger's television interview by accusing Washington of orchestrating a "week of hate." (8,270)

() British MLM tour detained by Soviet soldiers and Soviet officer displayed his "MLM information card"; in October USAREUR determined the card probably an East German police card. (8,270)

18 Sep () COL Lajoie asked GSFG for response to USAREUR's 11 Sep proposed text for concluding document, but response not received for 3 months. (8,274)

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u> (Chapter, Page)
	1985
<u>19 Sep</u>	(U) MAJ Nicholson posthumously promoted to lieutenant colonel and awarded a purple heart at private ceremony in Secretary Weinberger's office. (8,270-71)
<u>8 Oct</u>	() COL Lajoie inquired from GSFG about response to USAREUR's 11 Sep proposed text for concluding document, and asked if Soviets had decided to suspend the negotiations. (8,275)
<u>23 Oct</u>	() After no response for 6 weeks, COL Lajoie again questioned whether GSFG serious about concluding negotiations. (8,275)
<u>29 Oct</u>	() GEN Shevtsov did not know when negotiations would be concluded although all negotiation points essentially settled; perhaps recent reassignment of GEN Semyonov would cause delay. (8,275)
<u>7 Nov</u>	() Newly appointed US Ambassador to FRG, Richard Burt, met with Vyacheslav Kochemasov, Soviet Ambassador to East Germany. (8,273)
	() SMLM-F held Great Socialist Revolution reception, boycotted by ACS personnel. (8,273)
	() State Department in Washington informed by British Embassy of immediate resumption of social contacts with Soviets by British MLM. (8,273)
<u>14 Nov</u>	() COL Pereverzev said progress unlikely on proposed text for concluding negotiations, prior to Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. (8,275)
<u>22 Nov</u>	() USMLM vehicle one-car accident in East Germany was handled with courtesy and professionalism by Soviets. (8,274)
<u>3 Dec</u>	() COL Pereverzev said GSFG found most of USAREUR's 11 Sep changes acceptable, but insisted on including the "sentry on his post" statement in the formulations. USAREUR asked GSFG for their latest version of formulations in writing. (8,276)

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u> (Chapter, Page)
1985-1986	
<u>14 Dec</u>	() COL Lajoie met Secretary of State Shultz during a ceremony in Berlin. (8,273)
<u>16 Dec</u>	() LTC Kelley picked up requested latest version of GSFG's formulations at SERB; it was a duplicate of GSFG's 6 Sep proposed text. GEN Otis directed a third general-officer level negotiating session be arranged. (8,277)
<u>24 Dec</u>	() USAREUR forwarded to COL Lajoie the proposed opening statement for general-officer meeting. (8,277)
<u>27 Dec</u>	() COL Lajoie met with COL Pereverzev to set up third negotiating session. After COL Pereverzev brought up several points not on the GSFG text given to USMLM (on 16 Dec), he said USMLM must have received an erroneous text. (8,278)
<u>30 Dec</u>	
1200	() Third session of USAREUR-GSFG staff-level negotiations began at Potsdam Officers Club, and agreement reached on concluding text. Meeting concluded at 1550. (8,279)
1986	
<u>2 Jan</u>	() COL Medved said no official decision on the text of 30 Dec meeting had been made, and PRA maps had to be exchanged simultaneously. (9,310)
	() USEUCOM informed JCS that USAREUR and GSFG negotiators tentatively reached agreement on text of 30 Dec 85. (9,310)
<u>3 Jan</u>	() Although GEN Lushev approved the changes agreed to at 30 Dec session, he thought final sentence, point 3, should be separated from main paragraph. (9,310)
<u>9 Jan</u>	(U) Gen Otis sent letter to GEN Lushev recommending both sides accept the draft prepared and agreed to by both staffs on 30 Dec. (9,311)

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u> (Chapter, Page)
1986	
<u>Jan</u>	(3) GEN Sir Martin Farndale, CINCPAC, proposed to GEN Otis that Allies seek to exchange "draft" PRA maps with Soviets. (9,313)
<u>18 Jan</u>	(4) GEN Lushev's answer to GEN Otis' 9 Jan letter still insisted point 3 in last sentence be separated from rest of paragraph, and he reinserted a phrase that had been negotiated and compromised out. (9,313)
<u>22 Jan</u>	(U) GEN Otis proposed to GEN Lushev they meet at Heidelberg between 23 and 30 Jan to resolve remaining issue. (9,314)
<u>29 Jan</u>	(4) In response to GEN Otis' 22 Jan letter, GEN Lushev said he could not meet at that time, and had ordered a thorough review of point 3. (9,314)
<u>3 Feb</u>	() GEN Lushev decided to agree to 30 Dec text for point 3. (9,315)
	() COL Pereverzev asked how USMLM would respond to a Soviet Army-Navy Day celebration invitation. (9,315)
<u>7 Feb</u>	() USAREUR forwarded JCS-required defense of agreed summary up chain of command. (9,316)
<u>8 Feb</u>	() COL Lajoie told SERB that USAREUR HQ said it would not be appropriate for USMLM members to attend Soviet events at that time. (9,316)
	() Soviet side did not want to initial agreed summary, but preferred to exchange signed documents. (9,317)
<u>18 Feb</u>	() COL Lajoie flew to Washington to convince Inter-agency Group that text of agreed summary was the best that could be achieved and the agreements were beneficial to US. (9,317)
<u>19 Feb</u>	() Soviet Army-Navy Day celebration held. (9,315)
<u>23 Feb</u>	() COL Lajoie left for Berlin; Interagency Group supported agreed summary text, but it had not been approved by Secretary Weinberger or National Security Council. (9,317)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1986

28 Feb () Interagency Group agreed that State would draft a memo for President Reagan to sign directing that agreed summary be signed at 2-star level. (9,317)

4 Mar () COL Lajoie had a brief look at new Soviet PRA map and wanted to expedite exchange and implementation of new maps. (9,319)

6 Mar () All members of Interagency Group approved content and wording of agreed summary, but could not agree on how to conclude negotiations. (9,318)

Mar () Because of additional safety to USMLM members, Secretary Weinberger agreed to the document (not to be called an agreement) being signed, but wanted State to pursue apology and compensation issues vigorously. (9,318)

7 Mar () Allied tripartite meeting decided a note verbale be presented to Soviets proposing new PRA maps be exchanged on 30 April. Decision supported by GEN Otis. (9,319)

11 Mar () USEUCOM sent Washington the information in the USAREUR report and promised copies of agreed summary, instruction cards, and PRA maps would be forwarded when received. (9,343)

19 Mar () USAREUR public affairs guidance plan forwarded to USEUCOM. (9,319)

() COL Lajoie met with British and French MLM chiefs; they agreed to exchange PRA maps on 20 Apr and implement them on 30 Apr. (9,319)

20 Mar () USEUCOM said DoD policy (all queries on negotiations be referred to OSD Public Affairs Office) would continue. (9,319)

24 Mar () Ceremony in Berlin to memorialize first anniversary of MAJ Nicholson's death. (9,318)

1 Apr () JCS informed USAREUR and USEUCOM the National Security Council approved the text of agreed summary, and USAREUR authorized to conclude negotiations by signing it as soon as possible. (9,320)

DATE/TIME

EVENT (Chapter, Page)

1986

3 Apr

() COL Lajoie instructed by USAREUR to arrange a concluding meeting on 9 April. (9,320)

() Informed COL Medved Washington had approved summary text, and GEN Price empowered to sign. COL Lajoie gave COL Medved copies of agreed summary (in English and Russian) from 30 Dec meeting and interim discussions, and proposed GEN Price and GEN Bugrov meet in Heidelberg on 9 Apr to sign. (9,320)

(U) First SMAC meeting held in DCSOPS Operations Center. (10,350)

() Allies held chiefs-of-staff tripartite meeting because French wanted a 10-day delay between exchanging and implementation of maps. (10,353)

4 Apr

() Soviets wanted wording changes to agreed summary document, including shortening title; USAREUR agreed since substance of document not changed. (9,321)

5 Apr

() Soviets agreed to conclude negotiations on 9 April; COL Medved gave COL Lajoie final copy of texts for US inspection, in which last sentence of point 3 was set off from rest of paragraph. (9,321)

() USAREUR notified USEUCOM the Soviets agreed to come to Heidelberg, and requested concurrence on public affairs plan sent to USEUCOM 19 March. (9,321)

() Soviets wanted more changes to agreed upon summary document. COL Lajoie and COL Pereverzev met and agreed each side could use its own text since they were substantially the same; the English text would have one paragraph in point 3 and the Russian text would have two. (9,322)

8 Apr

() OSD Public Affairs Office responded there would be no public release of information on negotiations until after agreed summary had been signed. (9,321)

DATE/TIMEEVENT (Chapter, Page)

1986

8 Apr () USAREUR HQ disagreed with USMLM-SERB compromise on point 3, and instructed COL Lajoie to tell Soviets to come sign US version previously agreed upon, or not come at all. COL Lajoie and COL Pereverzev met and worked out compromise which USAREUR accepted, but 9 Apr meeting delayed one day. (9,322)

10 Apr

0930 () Concluding session of USAREUR-GSFG staff level negotiations in USAREUR HQ Keyes Building Conference Room, with both delegations the same except Soviets replaced a translator. (9,322)

1425 () After intense discussion on point 3, translators and MAJ Elliott signed back of both documents (Russian and English) verifying authenticity, and documents were signed -- Russian text having two paragraphs for point 3 and English version one paragraph. Meeting concluded at 1620. (9,322-341)

12 Apr () SERB called USMLM to protest latest news leak concerning the negotiations. (10,351)

16 Apr () French agreed PRA maps would go into effect at 2400 on day of the exchange. (10,353)

17 Apr () COL Lajoie read a note verbale to COL Medved stating that USAREUR had not released information to press; the western press ferreted out information on its own. (10,352)

9 Jun () New PRA maps exchanged simultaneously by all four parties to be effective at 0001 on 10 June. (10,353)

9 Jul () East German military vehicle collided with USMLM tour vehicle; Soviets acknowledged (first time) responsibility for ensuring East German military personnel would comply with Agreed Summary. (10,359)

() COL William Halloran, who assumed COL Lajoie's duties as Chief of USMLM in May, presented his credentials to GEN Lushev. (10,354)

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u> (Chapter, Page)
1986-1987	
<u>22 Aug</u>	(*) SERB presented COL Halloran with copies of new Soviet MLM card. Restriction on interzonal travel by SMLM personnel was lifted. (10,354)
<u>11 Sep</u>	() USAREUR forwarded assessment of Soviet compliance with Agreed Summary to JCS. (10,358)
<u>1 Oct</u>	() Due date of a report to National Security Council on extent of Soviet compliance with provisions of agreed summary. (10,358)
1987	
<u>11 Jun</u>	(U) Two East German teenagers shot to death by Soviet guard as they attempted to climb a wall that enclosed Soviet Army barracks. (epilogue, 363)
<u>17 Sep</u>	(U) Attempting a detention, Soviet military personnel fired at vehicle of USMLM vehicle, slightly wounding one member. Soviet Foreign Minister immediately apologized for the shooting. (epilogue, 363)

APPENDIX G
DETENTIONS 1951 - 1985

DETENTIONS 1951 - 1985

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
17 Apr 51	Lonnewitz Airfield	Details unknown. Tour vehicle was on main highway and was fired upon, one round penetrating the vehicle. No injuries.
3 Mar 55	Fahrland	Tour was photographing artillery pieces. As the vehicle drove off, a Soviet officer drew his pistol and fired three rounds without hitting the vehicle.
18 Apr 55	Jeuterborg Airfield	Tour was photographing aircraft when a Soviet jeep-type vehicle approached. Tour personnel got into vehicle and departed. Soviets dismounted and fired several rounds without hitting tour vehicle.
20 Oct 55	Wittstrock Airfield	Tour was photographing aircraft when a sentry appeared. Tour personnel got into vehicle and departed. Sentry and two other Soviets fired several rounds without hitting tour vehicle.
23 Apr 56	Raeglin	Tour was observing and photographing EG Army encampment. A shot was heard. As tour personnel got into vehicle a second shot was heard and bullet passed over the vehicle. Tour departed without the vehicle being hit.
22 May 56	Zerbst	Tour vehicle took a wrong turn and came upon the gate of what appeared to be a deserted driving range. Two Soviet guards appeared. Tour vehicle departed the area and was fired upon but not hit.
24 Jul 56	Gross Dolln Airfield	Tour was photographing aircraft when several Soviets in blue coveralls appeared. Tour departed the area and one shot was fired without hitting the tour vehicle.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
21 Jan 57	Elbe River at UT 051517	Tour was traveling on secondary road north of the river and came upon a small Soviet encampment. Tour approached the encampment and took photographs. Soviet officer and enlisted man ran toward tour vehicle, which departed. Several shots were fired without hitting the tour vehicle.
7 Feb 57	Alt Lonnwitz Airfield	Tour was stopped on main road at perimeter of airfield and photographing aircraft. As tour was departing, Soviet guard fired one round. Vehicle stopped, tour personnel dismounted and locked vehicle. Guard fired again, puncturing one tire on tour vehicle, and tour personnel were detained until Chief, USMLM and Chief SERB arrived on the scene some 6 hours later.
13 Oct 59	Fuerstenwalde	EGAF sentry fired one shot without warning - vehicle hit. Tour did not stop.
20 Mar 60	Hasse	EG civilians stopped USMLM vehicle claiming vehicle in maneuver area (false). Tour vehicle departed for Soviet Kommandatura. Fired upon by shotguns - vehicle hit. <u>Soviet Kommandant claimed civilians not under Soviet control.</u>
3 Jun 60	Babelsburg	Unknown persons forced USMLM vehicle to halt at gun point; requests for Soviet officer refused; US officers shoved, pushed, and insulted. Soviet officers arrived and released tour.
26 Jul 60	Bornim	"Tail" vehicle almost forced collision. VOPO and Soviets accused USMLM of traffic violation (false). "Tail" personnel threatened with pistol, made insulting and provocative remarks, Soviet Major stated neither Chief SERB nor Potsdam Kommandant could exert control over "tails" or secure adherence to terms of Huebner - Malinin Agreement.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
28-29 Sep	Brehns	USMLM vehicle tailed Soviet column. Soviets attempted to halt 61 vehicle, firing a warning shot.
10 Oct 61	Luebbenau	USMLM tour passing Soviet column. Soviet fired two warning shots.
20 Nov 61	Klausdorf Wiepersdorf	Tail personnel struck USMLM officer who struck back. Tour moved on with tail following. Slight accident occurred. Tail threatened vehicle with weapon. Soviets stated EG civilians agents of DDR, which is sovereign state, and Soviets had no control over them.
5 Dec 61	Gundow	VOPO vehicles blocked USMLM vehicle; USMLM vehicle escaped but was caught. VOPO drew pistol but USMLM driver disregarded and again escaped. No shots fired.
19 Feb 62	Treuen- brietze	Soviets attempted to halt tour and fired two warning shots.
20 Mar 62	Gotha	While driving toward Gotha, tour vehicle was stopped at approximately noon by EG police (VOPO) (exact location unknown). Tour demanded Soviet officer, was told one hour later none would come. Tour departed and was fired upon, one round striking the trunk and ricocheting into rear window. En route to Gotha to inform Soviets of shooting incident, one tire went flat. After changing tire and proceeding, tour was immobilized when a second tire went flat. Tour spent the night in the vehicle. USMLM notified of "breakdown" following morning, and vehicle with spare tire reached the detained tour at approximately 1400 hours.
22 Aug 62	Anklam	Tour vehicle vandalized while parked overnight. Vehicle smeared with paint, tires slashed, rear window broken, and vehicle looted.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
4 Sep 62	Weichensdorf	Tour was observing train carrying missiles when a guard fired and one round struck the vehicle. No injuries.
2 Apr 64	Brand	Tour was approaching Soviet installation and was observed by a guard. Tour departed the area and was fired upon without the vehicle being hit.
4 Oct 65	Thamsbrueck	While approaching Thamsbrueck, tour observed a Soviet military truck blocking the road. Tour turned around and two warning shots were fired at departing vehicle without hitting it.
7 Jul 66	No location given	Tour vehicle was parked on an overpass observing a passing Soviet train that carried missiles. Guard on train fired two shots that missed.
28 Jul 67	Pritzwalk	Tour was observing a radar site when a Soviet guard appeared. Tour departed and three shots were fired without hitting the tour vehicle.
15 Aug 67	Warenberg	As tour vehicle was departing an observation position in a wood, two Soviets appeared and one shot was fired in the air (possibly a blank round).
27 Jul 71	Jueterbog Airfield	Two dismounted tour members seized by Soviet guards, bound, and their equipment confiscated. Tour personnel held several hours (length of time not specified), interrogated by Soviets, and then escorted back to Potsdam Mission House. On 11 August tour personnel were declared persona non grata and Soviets returned some, but not all, of confiscated equipment.
14 Mar 72	Finsterwalde	Tour vehicle on a trail in woods surrounded and fired upon by approximately 10 VOPO personnel, presumably blank rounds, since no damage done.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
14 Mar 72	Petkus Range	Same tour as in previous incident was departing an observation post when a Soviet NCO smashed the left rear window with his rifle butt. No injuries.
12 Jul 72	Reinsdorf	Tour was observing airfield when a Soviet soldier fired one round that missed. Tour departed the area.
22 May 73	Jueterbog Airfield	When departing the area after observing aircraft, tour was chased by two Soviet trucks. Three pistol shots were fired without hitting the tour vehicle.
24 Jul 73	Storkow	Tour was photographing a military installation when an East German soldier appeared and fired two pistol shots in the air. Tour departed the area.
16 Sep 73	Wittstock	Tour was photographing a SAM site when a Soviet sentry approached. Tour personnel got into vehicle and departed at high speed as approximately 15-20 rounds were fired without hitting vehicle.
21 Oct 73	Guterfeld Training Area	Tour was traveling on a dirt road in the training area when East German guards fired two round without hitting the vehicle.
28 Oct	Leipzig area	At an unidentified installation near Leipzig, East German guards fired approximately 20 rounds at the tour vehicle as it departed the area at high speed. One round penetrated the driver's door and passed through the toe of his boot without injuring him.
6 Sep 74	Bretnig	While driving on public road toward Seeligstadt, tour vehicle passed East German sentry who fired one round without hitting the vehicle.
11 Aug 76	Nedlitz	While tour was stopped at a railroad crossing (barrier was down), three Soviet soldiers and one officer attempted to detain. Tour turned vehicle around and

proceeded along road away from barrier. Soviets fired two rounds. No damage or injuries incurred.

26 May 78	Gadow-Rossow	Tour was detained by Soviet platoon-size element. Tour equipment was confiscated; vehicle tires were slashed. Tour personnel were forcibly removed from the vehicle and interrogated. Tour vehicle was removed following day. No injuries were incurred.
17 Jul 78	Schoenhausen	Soviet soldier fired a single shot at USMLM tour from railroad troop car at the rear of a train. No damage or injuries were incurred.
15 Aug 78	Karl Marx Stadt	While in process of departing, Soviet foot patrol attempted to stop tour vehicle. At least three warning shots were fired when vehicle failed to stop. No round struck vehicle. No injuries were incurred.
28 Aug 78	Neustadt-Dosse	USMLM tour was fired upon from troop car at rear of a train. Tour was approximately 150 yards from rail line. Four rounds struck tour vehicle, one of which missed tour NCO by 20 centimeters. No injuries were incurred.
13 Mar 79	Athenstedt	Tour vehicle was intentionally rammed by an East German TATRA-813 vehicle. Ramming resulted in tour vehicle being thrown off the road and rolling over twice. All tour equipment was confiscated. Vehicle was rendered inoperable. Tour officer sustained injuries which incapacitated him for 4 weeks.
17 Jun 80	Beelitz	Tour vehicle was forced off the road avoiding an intentional ramming attempt by Soviet Kamaz vehicle. Soviet soldiers brandished weapons and looted vehicle. Vehicle remained operable. Tour officer received broken collar bone and shoulder injuries; driver incurred minor injuries.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
30 Jun 80	Priort	Tour vehicle was rammed at midpoint on driver's side by Soviet GAZ-53A truck. Soviet soldiers attempted to loot vehicle, but were resisted by noncommissioned officer/driver. Vehicle rendered inoperable. Tour officer and driver incurred minor injuries. Incident appeared to be result of preplanned Soviet ambush/detention.
10 Oct 80	Zerbst	USMLM tour was ambushed/detained by approximately 20 troops. Tour officer pulled from vehicle and thrown to ground. Officer and driver were vigorously manhandled and interrogated. All equipment was confiscated. No serious injuries resulted.
19 May 82	Moellern	Tour ambushed/detained. Two soldiers forced way through vehicle sunroof, beat officer and noncommissioned officer, dragged them from vehicle, tied their hands, and confiscated equipment. No serious, long-term injuries resulted.
28 Feb 83	Borenson	Approximately six aimed shots were fired directly at tour vehicle. No injuries resulted; no rounds struck tour vehicle.
28 May 83	Reitz	Soviet lieutenant fired warning shot from AK-47 rifle at USMLM tour. No injuries resulted.
12 Jan 84	Havelberg	Soviet lieutenant smashed the front windshield of a moving tour vehicle with a shovel. Tour officer stopped vehicle to avoid endangering Soviet soldiers standing on both sides of the road as his driver's vision was impaired. No one was injured.
24 Mar 85	Ludwigslust	Soviet sentry shot and killed USMLM tour officer. Tour NCO detained. Medical attention denied for close to one hour.

HQ USAREUR & 7A, DCSOPS, ATTN: AEAGC-O.....	2
HQ USAREUR & 7A, DCSINT, ATTN: AEAGB-C, AEAGB-CI.....	2
HQ USAREUR & 7A, OJA, ATTN: AEAJA-IL.....	1
HQ USAREUR & 7A, OCPA.....	1
HQ USAREUR & 7A, CMD GP, POLAD.....	1
HQ USAREUR & 7A, CMD GP, Mil Hist Ofc.....	5
USMLM.....	1
USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ2.....	1
USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ5.....	1
Am Emb Bonn.....	1
US Msn Berlin.....	1
State Dept, ATTN: Political/Military Bureau.....	1
OSD.....	1
OJCS.....	1
DIA, ATTN: OA-4.....	1
Sec Army.....	1
DA DCSINT, ATTN: DAHI-ISH.....	1
DA TJAG, ATTN: DAJA-IA.....	1
DA OCPA, ATTN: BG Hennies.....	1
Armed Forces Staff College.....	1
Army War College.....	1
Navy War College.....	1
Air War College.....	1
National War College.....	1
CGSC, Fort Leavenworth.....	1
USAMHI, Carlisle Bks.....	1
CMH, ATTN: HQDA-DAMH.....	6
III Corps, ATTN: AFZF-MH.....	3
USA Intel & Scty Cmd, ATTN: IAOPS-HIST.....	<u>1</u>
 TOTAL.....	 42

